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Abstract 
∎ More and more states and regional organisations employ the term “Indo-
Pacific”. It is increasingly supplanting the previously common term, 
“Asia-Pacific”. In Europe, only France has so far presented its own “Indo-
Pacific” concept. 
∎ The term “Indo-Pacific” is used to refer to various, sometimes divergent, 
concepts. These in turn are based on very different ideas on regional 
order. What they all have in common is the reference to the importance 
of a rules-based international order. 
∎ “Indo-Pacific” is a political term and therefore neither purely descriptive 
nor value-neutral. In particular, the Trump administration’s “Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific” concept aims to contain China and is thus an expres-
sion of the growing strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In 
Beijing, “Indo-Pacific” is primarily understood as a U.S.-led containment 
strategy directed against China. 
∎ Other actors, for example ASEAN or India, emphasise aspects such as 
economic prosperity, connectivity and multilateral cooperation in their 
Indo-Pacific concepts. 
∎ The EU and its member states are under increasing pressure from 
Washington to commit themselves directly or indirectly to the “Indo-
Pacific” – and thus, from a U.S. perspective, for Washington and against 
Beijing. In their deliberations, Europeans should not succumb to this 
zero-sum logic. 
∎ The EU and its member states have at their disposal three (ideal type) 
approaches: “equidistance”, “alignment” and “autonomy”. In order to 
be able to choose one option, Europeans must define their economic, 
security and normative interests in the region and provide the necessary 
resources for their advancement. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: 
Significance, Implementation 
and Challenges 
In Asia, competing ideas of order for the region have 
emerged in recent years, with the potential to spark 
multiple conflicts. For almost 70 years, the system of 
order in the Asia-Pacific region, often referred to as 
“Pax Americana” and dominated by the United States, 
had not been called into question. This has changed 
in the second decade of the 21st century. In the con-
text of China’s rise to become the world’s largest 
economy, which has also changed the regional bal-
ance of power in political and military terms, Beijing 
developed its own ideas and concepts of regional 
order and subsequently launched its own initiatives. 
These moves are driven by Beijing’s increasing claim 
to shape or reshape the regional (and international) 
order in accordance with its own interests. The 
Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) is a direct 
expression of this claim. 
In response to this, in recent years a number of 
states have developed alternative concepts under the 
label “Indo-Pacific”. First and foremost, the United 
States under President Donald Trump has attempted 
to respond directly to the perceived Chinese challenge 
by presenting a strategic concept called the “Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) as a counter narrative to a 
potential Sinocentric reorganisation or restructuring 
of the region. In addition, Japan, Australia, India and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
have also presented their own concepts of the “Indo-
Pacific”. France is the only member state of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) that has adopted the term “Indo-
Pacific” and drawn up a corresponding strategy, which 
derives mainly from the protection of national inter-
ests in its own territories in the region. China, on the 
other hand, rejects the concept of “Indo-Pacific” – 
and the FOIP in particular – as a containment strat-
egy directed against Beijing. 
The U.S., in particular, has increased pressure on 
states in and outside the region, including Germany 
and other EU member states, to commit themselves 
directly or indirectly to the concept of the “Indo-
Pacific”. 
The present analysis shows that there is no uni-
form Indo-Pacific concept to date. Rather, the term 
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is used by the United States, Japan, Australia, India 
and ASEAN to refer to very different, in part divergent 
concepts, which in turn are based on different ideas 
on regional order. The divergences involve, among 
other things, a) the extension of the Indo-Pacific as 
a geographical area, b) the objectives associated with 
each respective concept, c) the focus on or weighting 
of different policy fields within each respective con-
cept, d) the question of China’s inclusion or exclu-
sion, and e) the significance of bi-, mini- and multi-
lateral approaches to trade and security policy. And 
while the United States, in particular, is using the 
FOIP to openly position itself against China across 
various policy fields, states such as Japan or Australia 
are not seeking a comprehensive “decoupling” from 
China, especially not economically. 
Furthermore, the analysis makes it clear that none 
of the Indo-Pacific concepts available to date offer 
new ideas on how to deal with the rise of China, which 
affects many policy areas. For example, the responses 
laid out in the FOIP of the Trump administration (but 
also the responses of other regional governments) to 
such multidimensional challenges have thus far been 
defined primarily in terms of security policy. 
Moreover, Washington seems very unlikely to buy 
into a more multilaterally oriented or even inclusive 
concept of the Indo-Pacific. On the contrary, from the 
Trump administration’s perspective, the geopolitical 
changes in Asia constitute a zero-sum game in which 
the “friends” of the United States should “decide” 
whether or not they want to cooperate with China or 
the United States. This is how Secretary of Defense 
Mark Esper expressed it at the Munich Security Con-
ference. 
Against this background, there is widespread 
debate in Europe over whether to take a position and 
what course of action to take in the Indo-Pacific strat-
egy debate. German and European decision-makers 
are well advised to take a close look at existing con-
cepts, identify convergences and divergences with 
their own interests, and realistically assess the scope 
of the various Indo-Pacific concepts. 
There are a number of issues or challenges that 
have not been sufficiently addressed in the European 
debate: Can the term “Indo-Pacific” be used in a less 
securitised and less geo-politicised manner? (It could, 
for example, initially serve as a geographical term 
that describes an economic shift in emphasis and the 
growing importance of the Indian Ocean and India 
more adequately than the previously common “Asia-
Pacific” construct. Conceiving of it this way would be 
more acceptable to Europeans.) Are synergy effects in 
interaction with already existing Indo-Pacific concepts 
conceivable? What concrete goals and priorities, in-
cluding the importance of bi-, mini- and multilateral 
approaches, should the EU pursue? The question of 
whether China should be included or excluded from 
the Indo-Pacific concept has also been insufficiently 
discussed in Europe to date. 
In their deliberations, the EU and its Member States 
should in any case eschew the zero-sum logic that 
currently dominates the debate. Ideally, there are 
three possible approaches: 
1. “Equidistance”: a conscious and open decision to 
retain the term “Asia-Pacific” while avoiding the 
“Indo-Pacific” construct altogether. 
2. “Alignment”: adopting and internalizing one of the 
already existing interpretations of the “Indo-Pacific”. 
From a German or European perspective, adopting 
the French concept would be the obvious choice. 
3. “Autonomy”: defining a European understanding 
of the “Indo-Pacific” based on European norms and 
values and referring to the ideas and approaches 
already developed at the European level. 
Perhaps even more important, however, than 
choosing one of the three approaches is formulating 
a clear definition of the economic, security and nor-
mative interests of Europeans in the region. That also 
means providing the necessary resources. Only if the 
latter is guaranteed can Europe act credibly in the 
region – also with respect to China. 
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The “Indo-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific region” has en-
joyed growing popularity for over ten years as a 
geographical and strategic construct in the foreign 
and security policy discourse in Japan, the United 
States, Australia, India, France and some Southeast 
Asian states. Many see “Indo-Pacific” as a new geo-
graphical and strategic frame of reference that has 
at least partially come to replace the previously 
dominant “Asia-Pacific” construct. 
The term has found its way into official documents 
such as national security strategies or defence white 
papers as well as into the rhetoric of the elites. It is 
also increasingly being discussed in think tanks and 
academic institutions. As a result, it has become a 
kind of “geopolitical nomenclature”.1 
Although each country has its own understanding 
of the concept, in terms of both the geographical ex-
tent of the Indo-Pacific region and its strategic orien-
tation and essential attributes, there is a common 
denominator: The two oceans, the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific, are imagined as one contiguous area. 
This understanding is based on the fact that the vast 
majority of the world’s flows of goods, but also energy 
supplies, are transported via sea routes that traverse 
these two oceans. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is cur-
rently the arena in which growing rivalry between the 
United States and China in Asia is being played out. 
Accordingly, it has gained in importance geopolitical-
ly and geo-economically over the last two decades. 
Moreover, many Asian actors see it not only as a 
“purely” geographical construct but also as an alter-
native to the Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) 
(see blue box on page 8). Geopolitical and geo-eco-
nomic aspects are thus closely intertwined in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
 
1 John Hemmings, Global Britain in the Indo-Pacific, Asia 
Studies Centre, Research Paper no. 2/2018 (London: Henry 
Jackson Society, May 2018), 17. 
The Indo-Pacific is closely linked 
to various aspects of the 
Sino-American rivalry. 
This entanglement has taken place in the context 
of the rivalry between the United States and China, 
which in the last two years has become a guiding 
paradigm in international relations, especially in Asia; 
it shapes strategic debates as well as real political, 
military and economic dynamics. The Sino-American 
competition for power and status comprises several 
dimensions. Principal among these are perceptions 
of military threat, conflicts in trade policy, political-
ideological aspects and competing ideas on regional 
order. However, the rivalry also centres on technology 
policy or on the issue of connectivity, for example 
with respect to infrastructure policy. Increasingly, 
therefore, technology development and its use, as 
well as infrastructure, are considered elements of the 
competition between the United States and China.2 
The Indo-Pacific is thus in many respects closely 
linked to various aspects of the Sino-American rivalry. 
Not all states (both inside and outside the region) 
have committed themselves to the concept of the 
Indo-Pacific as a new regional frame of reference – 
above all not China, which interprets the Indo-Pacific 
primarily as a strategy directed against it by the United 
States. In some Southeast Asian states there is also 
scepticism or criticism; on the one hand because the 
concept calls into question the centrality of ASEAN, 
on the other hand because the focus of the policy 
(above all in the formulation of the United States) is 
on security policy, namely the containment of China. 
Added to this is the perception that, among other 
things, the economic prosperity of the region as a 
 
2 Barbara Lippert and Volker Perthes, eds., Strategic Rivalry 
between United States and China. Causes, Trajectories, and Implica-
tions for Europe, SWP Research Paper 4/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), doi: 10.18449/2020RP04. 
“Indo-Pacific”: 
The Construction of a Region 
“Indo-Pacific”: The Construction of a Region 
SWP Berlin 
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 
July 2020 
8 
whole has been largely neglected. States such as 
South Korea or Canada have thus far not used the 
term. Of the EU Member States, only France has 
adopted it and presented an Indo-Pacific strategy.3 
Against this background, it should be noted that 
the (different) concepts of the Indo-Pacific as a geo-
graphically and strategically understood space are 
based on specific political intentions and interests. 
The term “Indo-Pacific” itself, as well as its use, is 
therefore never merely descriptive or value-neutral. 
Rather, the implicitly or actively drawn borders asso-
ciated with it, inclusion and exclusion mechanisms, 
and the attribution of particular characteristics are 
always political in nature.4 
 
3 Ministry of Defence of France, France and Security in the 
Indo-Pacific (Paris, May 2019). 
4 Gearóid O’Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing 
Global Space, Borderlines, vol. 6 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648. 
Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations 
(London: Verso, 2003); Jason Dittmer and Joanne Sharp, eds., 
Geopolitics. An Introductory Reader (London: Routledge, 2014). 
The map on page 10 shows the spatial interpreta-
tions of the Indo-Pacific of the United States, Japan, 
Australia and India, the map on page 37 the spatial 
understanding of France. 
In the first part, this study examines the various 
concepts of the Indo-Pacific and their implementa-
tions in the United States, Japan, Australia, India and 
ASEAN by means of a comparative analysis. Although 
several collections of articles have already been pub-
lished that illuminate the Indo-Pacific from the per-
spective of various states,5 a systematic comparison 
 
5 See, e.g., Axel Berkofsky and Sergio Miracola, eds., Geo-
politics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality (Milan: Italian 
Institute for International Political Studies [ISPI], February 
2019), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubbli 
cazioni/indo-pacific_web.def_.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020); 
Sharon Stirling, ed., Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific, GMF Asia Program 2019, no. 9 (Washington, 
D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States [GMF], 
23 April 2019), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/mind-gap-
national-views-free-and-open-indo-pacific (accessed 29 April 
2020); Special Issue Unpacking the Strategic Dynamic of the Indo-
Pacific of International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020); Congressional 
Background: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
∎ China’s President and party leader Xi Jinping announced 
the BRI 2013 under its original name “One Belt, One Road” 
(OBOR), first in Kazakhstan (September), then in Indonesia 
(October). He raised the prospect of a major infrastructure 
initiative to connect China/Asia with Europe, including 
Africa (“new silk roads”). The concept initially remained 
vague and only took shape in the course of the following 
years. 
∎ The official document Visions and Actions presented the fol-
lowing pillars of OBOR in 2015: Policy coordination, connec-
tivity of institutions (infrastructure and standards), trade 
connectivity, financial integration and people-to-people 
links. In 2017, BRI was enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and Xi Jinping hosted the first 
Silk Road or “Belt and Road” summit in Beijing. A second 
summit followed in 2019. 
∎ The renaming of the initiative as BRI in mid-2016 was in-
tended to signal that it was “merely” an initiative and at  
  the same time more than just a road and a belt but rather 
a global network. BRI became the framework for existing 
projects, such as economic corridors. New dimensions such 
as the digital, the arctic or the “green” silk road have since 
been added. 
∎ BRI is a multidimensional global project of China-centred 
connectivity and networking. The concrete projects are fi-
nanced primarily through Chinese loans and most are real-
ized by Chinese companies. While China describes the BRI 
as “open”, “inclusive” and “win-win” cooperation, foreign 
observers criticize above all the lack of transparency sur-
rounding the agreements between China and BRI partner 
countries as well as the accumulation of debt and the result-
ant dependence of these partners on China. The West in par-
ticular sees the BRI as an essential part of China’s attempt 
to create an alternative to the existing international order. 
Literature: 
Nadine Godehardt, No End of History. A Chinese Alternative Concept of 
International Order? SWP Research Paper 2/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016). 
Paul Joscha Kohlenberg and Nadine Godehardt, China’s Global 
Connectivity politics. On Confidently Dealing with Chinese Initiatives, 
SWP Comments 17/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2018). 
 
Colin Flint and Cuiping Zhu, “The Geopolitics of Connectivity, 
Cooperation, and Hegemonic Competition: The Belt and Road 
Initiative”, Geoforum 99 (February 2019): 95–101. 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, The Road Less 
Travelled. European Involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 
2020 (online, accessed 28 April 2020). 
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based on a uniform analytical framework is presented 
here for the first time. The case studies are based on 
the following key questions: 
1.  Where did the term originate? How and by whom 
is the term “Indo-Pacific” currently used? 
2. What are the objectives and priorities of the con-
cept? 
3. What initiatives have been launched so far under 
the “Indo-Pacific” label? 
4. What ideas on regional order are associated with 
the “Indo-Pacific”? Is it understood as a new, alter-
native model of order for the region? 
In a second step, the study investigates China’s 
responses to the “Indo-Pacific” concept. It then ana-
lyses the response of the EU and its member states, 
examines the implications for German and European 
foreign policy, and takes stock of the challenges posed 
by the various Indo-Pacific conceptions. Finally, three 
options are presented as to how the EU and its mem-
bers could ideally deal with this construct. 
 
Research Service (CRS), Indo-Pacific Strategies of U.S. Allies and 
Partners: Issues for Congress, CRS Report R46217 (Washington, 
D.C., 30 January 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/ 
product/pdf/ R/R46217 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
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The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy 
of the United States 
President Donald Trump first presented his “vision” of 
a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in November 2017 
at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) sum-
mit in Hanoi.6 President Barack Obama had already 
strategically connected the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
to form an “Indo-Pacific” region and outlined plans 
for an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) in addi-
tion to the political and military “pivot to Asia”.7 In 
contrast to the Obama administration, however, the 
Trump administration sees the “Indo-Pacific region” 
as a central foreign and economic policy arena for 
dealing with China. In 2018 Vice President Mike 
Pence drew considerable attention when he delivered 
a speech denouncing China’s behaviour and con-
demning its repeated interference in the internal 
affairs of other states (including the United States) 
and its aggressive policy in the South China Sea.8 
Soon afterwards then U.S. Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson defined the “less responsible” approach 
of an increasingly powerful China to international 
standards and Beijing’s deliberate undermining of 
 
6 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC 
CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam”, Da Nang, 10 November 
2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/ 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
7 David Scott, “The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding 
to Power Shifts”, Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2018): 19–43. 
8 Hudson Institute, “Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks 
on the Administration’s Policy towards China”, Washington, 
D.C., 4 October 2018, https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-
vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-
policy-towards-china102018 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
the “international rules-based order” as Washington’s 
main challenge.9 
Donald Trump seeks to implement a reorientation 
of U.S. policy towards China through the FOIP. This 
approach is based on his criticism of the previous ad-
ministration’s Asia policy, which in his view initially 
announced an “Asia pivot” and later a rebalancing 
to the region but never fully implemented it.10 At 
the Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Mark Esper called on “friends” of the United 
States to “choose” between the systems of the 
United States and China when considering whom to 
cooperate with.11 
Since the end of 2017, the term “FOIP” has been 
enshrined in official documents, for example the 
White House National Security Strategy (see timeline 
on page 12), and has been referred to as a “whole of 
government” approach since 2018. The White House 
and, among others, the U.S. Department of Defense, 
the State Department and the Department of Com-
merce have either published their own strategy papers 
in this regard or at least publicly referred to the FOIP 
 
9 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
“Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: 
An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson”, Wash-
ington, D.C., 18 October 2017. 
10 Michal Kolmaš and Šárka Kolmašová, “A ‘Pivot’ That 
Never Existed: America’s Asian Strategy under Obama and 
Trump”, in: Cambridge Review of International Affairs 32, no. 1 
(2019): 61–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018. 
1553936 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
11 U.S. Department of Defense, “As Prepared Remarks by 
Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper at the Munich Security 
Conference”, Munich, 15 February 2020, https://www. 
defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/ 
remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-
security-conference/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
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through their representatives. Although there is as yet 
no definitive document detailing the Trump admin-
istration’s FOIP strategy in detail, there is cross-agency 
coherence on the key objectives of FOIP, particularly 
the containment of China. These are to be achieved 
in accordance with four principles: respect for the 
sovereignty and independence of all states, peaceful 
conflict resolution, free trade and respect for inter-
national law.12 
Concept, evolution and goals 
The Indo-Pacific is presented in official documents 
as a geopolitical and geo-economic space central to 
defending the global interests of the United States. 
However, its geographical boundaries are not pre-
cisely defined. It extends across the entire Indian 
Ocean, from U.S. overseas territories such as Guam 
and American Samoa in the West Pacific to U.S. 
states such as Hawaii and California, and includes 
all nations bordering these two oceans.13 
The question of whether China is or could be part 
of the FOIP was neither explicitly denied nor affirmed 
in the official announcements on the Indo-Pacific 
until the second half of 2019. But more general strat-
egy papers published in parallel, such as the National 
Security Strategy (NSS), clearly identify China as an ad-
versary aiming to undermine the rules-based inter-
national order.14 The U.S. State Department made it 
clear at the end of 2019, however, that (at least in 
theory) the U.S. vision of FOIP does not exclude any 
nation.15 Secretary of Defense Esper made this even 
clearer in a speech in Hanoi by emphasising the 
inclusive nature of the FOIP and saying that it was 
 
12 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. 
Advancing a Shared Vision (Washington, D.C., 4 November 
2019), 6, https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-
advancing-a-shared-vision/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
13 The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. 
Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region 
(Washington, D.C., 1 June 2019), 1, https://media.defense.gov/ 
2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-
PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed 29 April 2020). 
14 U.S. Department of Defense, “As Prepared Remarks by 
Secretary Esper at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels”, 
Brussels, 24 October 2019, https://www.defense.gov/ 
Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1997187/as-prepared-
remarks-by-secretary-esper-at-the-german-marshall-fund-in-
brussels/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
15 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12), 6. 
directed “to all nations, including China”.16 Never-
theless, at the end of his speech, he underlined that 
given its current state and its foreign policy objec-
tives, China is primarily seen as an opponent and a 
competitor when it comes to the political order in 
the region envisioned by Washington. 
The development of the FOIP since 2017 has been 
based primarily on the definition of standards and 
principles. Initially, these related mainly to the eco-
nomic interaction between the United States and the 
states in the region, above all China. Trump empha-
sised the need to establish “fair”, “reciprocal” trade 
relations based on principles such as respect for intel-
lectual property rights, free trade, and protection 
of private property, fair competition and open mar-
kets.17 In Da Nang 2017, Trump referred to respect 
for these principles as “playing by the rules”. 
In the meantime, other principles have been added 
which go beyond economic cooperation and which, 
in Washington’s reading, form the foundation of the 
currently existing international order: respect for the 
sovereignty and independence of all states, peaceful 
conflict resolution and respect for international rules, 
including freedom of air and sea transport.18 In Wa-
shington’s opinion, the continued existence of the 
current international order is being threatened by 
the presence of illiberal, authoritarian regimes. 
In the international arena, the “Free” in “FOIP” 
stands for the freedom of all states to exercise their 
sovereignty without interference by other states. At 
the national level this corresponds to good govern-
ance and the protection of human and civil rights. 
“Open” is interpreted as free access to international 
waters, airspace and digital space, as well as open 
access to markets and fair, reciprocal trade.19 From 
the U.S. perspective, China is also increasingly under-
mining the principle of openness, inter alia through 
 
16 U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, “Secretary 
of Defense Mark T. Esper Remarks at Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam”, Hanoi, 20 November 2019, https://vn.usembassy. 
gov/secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-remarks-at-diplomatic-
academy-of-vietnam/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
17 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump at 
APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam” (see note 6). 
18 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12), 6. 
19 The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
(see note 13), 4. 
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its militarization of artificial islands in the South 
China Sea.20 
The FOIP-relevant documents emphasise the im-
portance of investment for the region, especially in 
the area of infrastructure, and call for a stronger role 
for the United States in infrastructure investment as 
an alternative to “state-directed” (i.e. Chinese) invest-
ments.21 These documents thus leave little doubt 
that the FOIP is directed primarily at responding to 
China’s behaviour, which in Washington’s view is 
increasingly “aggressive” and is “undermining” the 
rules-based international order. In particular, the 
Pentagon’s FOIP paper consumes far more pages pre-
senting China as a “revisionist power” than it does 
outlining the actual U.S. goals and strategy in con-
nection with the FOIP. 
The main focus of the U.S. FOIP has 
so far been on the policy areas of 
security and defence. 
Given the dominance of the Pentagon in the debate 
on FOIP, it is not surprising that the focus of FOIP has 
so far been primarily on the policy areas of security 
and defence. The Department of Defense focuses 
on three dimensions: preparedness, partnerships and 
promoting a networked region. In general, “prepar-
edness” is understood to mean a comprehensive mod-
ernisation of the U.S. armed forces, which according 
to the Pentagon is necessary to secure long-term U.S. 
influence in the region. This prioritisation is based on 
the assumption that future conflict and war scenarios 
will take place where “competing powers” want to ex-
pand their areas of influence through military power 
to the detriment of the United States. In order to be 
able to react quickly to such scenarios, the expansion 
of military capabilities is to be promoted in close co-
operation with partners such as Japan and Australia. 
The “partnerships” dimension focuses primarily on 
strengthening the existing system of bilateral military 
alliances with Asian states such as Japan or South 
Korea – but also on expanding this system through 
closer cooperation with established partners such as 
Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand and Mongolia. For 
South Asia, in addition to promoting an “important 
 
20 U.S. Embassy Vietnam, “Secretary of Defense Mark 
T. Esper Remarks at Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam” 
(see note 16). 
21 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12), 13. 
defence partnership” with India, the aim is to inten-
sify cooperation with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangla-
desh and Nepal. The same applies to the Southeast 
Asian states Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, 
Laos, Brunei Darussalam and the West Pacific island 
states. Foreign military sales are envisaged as the 
main instrument for consolidating existing partner-
ships and establishing new ones. In addition to the 
sale of U.S. military technology to partners, military 
aid, joint manoeuvres, and training programs for 
(foreign) military personnel in the United States are 
listed.22 However, states such as Cambodia, Laos or 
some Pacific island states with which there is no 
active military cooperation to date or that, like Cam-
bodia in 2017, have unilaterally ended military co-
operation with the United States are also mentioned 
in this context.23 
In 2017 and 2018, criticism was repeatedly voiced, 
especially by Southeast Asian states, because the FOIP 
was (until then) almost exclusively based on bilateral 
alliances. In 2019, the United States responded to this 
by undertaking to “promote a networked region” by 
expanding tripartite and multilateral commitments 
and establishing a “networked security architecture” 
spanning the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN is to be at the cen-
tre of this multilateral dimension,24 drawing on estab-
lished multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). However, 
no new multilateral initiatives in security policy 
are planned under the label “FOIP”.25 Rather, existing 
multilateral initiatives, such as the Lower Mekong 
Initiative (LMI), have been subsumed under the FOIP 
label, quasi retroactively.26 
Another focus of the FOIP is on economic coopera-
tion with the countries of the region and infrastruc-
ture development within the region. The FOIP Report 
of the State Department devotes most of its attention 
to this cooperation. Here, too, there is a mixture of 
already existing measures, subsequently combined 
under the FOIP umbrella, and new initiatives. 
 
22 The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
(see note 13), 22. 
23 Ibid., 40. 
24 U.S. Embassy Vietnam, “Secretary of Defense Mark T. 
Esper Remarks at Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam” 
(see note 16); U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (see note 12), 7. 
25 The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
(see note 13), 44–47. 
26 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12), 8. 
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The principles of good governance and trade ap-
pear to be far less developed in terms of the overall 
content of the FOIP. Even the State Department’s 
report devotes only one page to the area of good gov-
ernance. Emphasis is placed on the Indo-Pacific Trans-
parency Initiative (IPTI), which supports the fight 
against corruption in the region but also aims to pro-
mote democracy, youth development and press free-
dom. Since 2018, the IPTI has contributed over $600 
million to addressing these concerns. Under the label 
of “good governance”, this section also lists humani-
tarian aid for the Rohingya and U.S. support for 
Myanmar in holding free and fair elections in 2020, 
but beyond that, this section essentially lists China’s 
authoritarian failures and is limited to the proclama-
tion of supposedly universal norms such as “open 
societies” and “open markets”.27 
The implementation of “America 
first” has often led to conflicts with 
countries in the region in terms of 
trade policy. 
Trade policy is potentially the most problematic 
part of the FOIP in terms of its external impact. The 
objective of promoting “free, fair, and reciprocal 
trade” underscores the Trump administration’s under-
standing of trade policy as something which demands 
immediate reciprocal action and is guided by the 
principle of “America first”. The corresponding ini-
tiatives within the framework of FOIP are therefore 
aimed at “deploying new and innovative mechanisms 
to improve market access and level the playing field 
for U.S. businesses”. Among other things, this ap-
proach is intended to create incentives for private U.S. 
companies to invest more heavily in the emerging 
markets of the region. The only measures explicitly 
cited are the trade agreement between the United 
States and Japan and the renegotiation of the free 
trade agreement between South Korea and the United 
States.28 Contrary to expectations in many quarters, 
it has not yet been possible to conclude a free trade 
agreement between the United States and India. And 
the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), a multilateral trade agreement, 
shortly after Trump took office. 
In sum, the implementation of “America first” 
has often led to conflicts with countries in the region 
 
27 Ibid., 21. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
rather than binding the Asian states more closely 
to the United States in trade policy terms. The FOIP 
documents make no attempt to outline a regional 
trade strategy that goes beyond bilateral agreements. 
Concrete initiatives and implementation 
The analysis of the political context and the declared 
objectives of FOIP has made it clear that FOIP is pri-
marily a response to China’s BRI (see blue box on 
page 8). This Chinese initiative is currently estimated 
to comprise a total volume of over $1 trillion and 
more than 2,200 projects in 87 countries. It has estab-
lished Beijing as a key player in Asia, particularly in 
development cooperation. 
The FOIP is an attempt to respond to this develop-
ment through a number of different initiatives. Part-
ners for these initiatives can be found primarily 
among U.S. allies and, secondarily, among the “stra-
tegic partners” of the United States in Asia. In the 
security policy area, U.S. arms exports to partner coun-
tries have been expanded, for example the export 
of F18 and F16 fighter aircraft to India.29 In order to 
be prepared for future conflict scenarios, the United 
States plans to promote the purchase of new air-to-air 
missiles, air-to-ground missiles, anti-submarine-war-
fare systems, missile defence systems and fighter jets 
in cooperation with Japan and Australia. In addition 
to the existing U.S. military bases in the region, the 
Lombrum naval base on the island of Manus is to be 
expanded in cooperation with Papua New Guinea and 
Australia.30 
Cooperation in the security and defence sector has 
been intensified. One example of this is the training 
of Sri Lankan security forces by FBI experts in counter-
terrorism, which has been underway since 2018. 
In addition, existing forms of cooperation are now 
declared as FOIP initiatives, such as the annual “Mala-
bar” exercise off the coast of India, in which Ameri-
can, Indian and Japanese naval units have been par-
ticipating since 2015, or the annual “Chiefs of Defense 
Conference”, renamed the “Indo-Pacific Chiefs of 
Defense Conference” in 2019. In the context of FOIP 
policy, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 
with Japan, India and Australia has also been revived. 
 
29 CSIS, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next 
Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson” 
(see note 9). 
30 The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
(see note 13), 16–19. 
The Indo-Pacific: Emergence, Objectives, Key Issues and Ideas on Regional Order 
SWP Berlin 
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 
July 2020 
16 
The Quad can be regarded as the core of FOIP at the 
institutional level and was upgraded to ministerial 
level in 2019. Finally, the United States has stepped 
up its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) 
in the South China Sea. 
Although ASEAN and its affiliated multilateral 
forums, such as ARF and EAS, have been described 
as the institutional core of a FOIP, corresponding U.S. 
initiatives have not materialized. Not only that: In 
2019, the Trump administration snubbed many of 
its partners in Southeast Asia by sending only the 
American national security advisor, not even a mem-
ber of the cabinet, to the EAS summit, which nor-
mally takes place at the level of heads of state. 
New development cooperation initiatives have also 
been launched in the context of the FOIP. At the legal 
level, two initiatives have been adopted: the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development 
Act (BUILD Act) and the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
Act (ARIA). These initiatives are intended to consoli-
date the role of the United States as a donor country 
in Asia and provide an alternative to Chinese develop-
ment initiatives. The BUILD Act provides for the 
establishment of the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation (IDFC), which will better coordi-
nate lending to developing countries, especially in 
Asia and Africa, and provide alternatives to “state-
directed initiatives that come with hidden strings 
attached”.31 In addition, the “Blue Dot Network” is to 
be set up together with Australia and Japan to estab-
lish a network for the certification of such high-quality, 
transparent infrastructure projects as an alternative 
to Chinese investments. 
However, the $60 billion that has been made avail-
able for the IDFC seems like a drop in the ocean com-
pared to BRI.32 The ARIA, adopted at the end of 2018, 
will allow the government to spend up to $1.5 billion 
annually to implement a number of objectives linked 
to the FOIP concept, such as developing the defence 
capabilities of U.S. partners or promoting democracy.33 
Other initiatives such as Enhancing Development and 
 
31 Bhavan Jaipragas, “Trump Strikes a Blow in US-China 
Struggle with Build Act to Contain Xi’s Belt and Road”, South 
China Morning Post, 20 October 2018, https://www.scmp.com/ 
week-asia/geopolitics/article/2169441/trump-strikes-blow-us-
china-struggle-build-act-contain-xis (accessed 29 April 2020). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Library of Congress, “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
2018”, Washington, D.C., 31 December 2018, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2736/text (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
Growth through Energy (Asia EDGE) and the Indo-
Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) are also being imple-
mented. Their aim is to strengthen the role of U.S. 
investors in the region in geopolitically important 
areas such as energy and infrastructure and to better 
coordinate U.S. government policy with U.S. business 
interests.34 
A more recent project is the Infrastructure Trans-
action and Assistance Network (ITAN), which is de-
signed to support regional infrastructure and connec-
tivity initiatives and thus provide Asian countries 
with an alternative to BRI. As part of ITAN, a Trans-
action Advisory Fund (TAF) has been established to 
help Asian partners assess the financial and environ-
mental impact of infrastructure measures.35 
Recent initiatives also include the U.S. govern-
ment’s $100 million “Pacific Pledge”, a plan to double 
U.S. development funding for the Pacific states over 
the next several years. The plan also provides for the 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) to increase its presence in the Western 
Pacific. In addition, Washington has set up the Pacific 
Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) within the frame-
work of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in order 
to help finance infrastructure measures in the Pacific. 
Also new is the Papua New Guinea Electrification 
Partnership (PEP), which was set up with the aim of 
fundamentally improving the power supply in Papua 
New Guinea together with Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand.36 
Ideas on regional order 
In the publications of various U.S. government depart-
ments, as well as in speeches delivered by U.S. offi-
cials on FOIP, there are numerous implicit elements 
that are not always congruent. Despite these differ-
ences, at least three recurring elements can be iden-
tified: offering the states of the region an alternative 
to the Chinese BRI, securing freedom of navigation in 
the Indo-Pacific, and making trade relations between 
 
34 Phuwit Limviphuwat, “American Investors Eye Energy 
Sector under Asia Edge Initiative”, The Nation, 21 June 2019, 
https://www.nationthailand.com/business/30371530 (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
35 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12), 15. 
36 Ibid., 11. 
 Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: From strategy to vision 
 SWP Berlin 
 From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 
 July 2020 
 17 
the Asian states and the United States “free, fair and 
reciprocal”.37 
For the United States, the implicit 
core intention of the FOIP is to 
formulate an interdepartmental 
response to China’s growing 
influence in the region. 
These three elements indicate that for the United 
States the implicit core intention of the FOIP is to for-
mulate a coherent, interdepartmental response to 
China’s growing influence in the region. Therefore, 
the FOIP calls for neither a return to the era of “Pax 
Americana” nor the creation of a changed, alternative 
model of order. Instead, it is primarily a reactive con-
cept that does not envision a new model of order. It 
therefore does not mark a new U.S. strategy for Asia. 
No such claim is formulated and no corresponding 
capacities and resources are provided for such a strat-
egy. It is also not surprising in this context that the 
publication of a comprehensive FOIP strategy docu-
ment, which has been announced several times, has 
so far failed to materialise. 
The FOIP is based on existing, U.S.-dominated, 
concepts of regional order, based on bilateral alli-
ances and strategic partnerships. The few multilat-
eral elements contained in the documents, such as 
the emphasis on ASEAN centrality, have been largely 
ignored. This tendency corresponds not only to the 
downgrading of the U.S. presence in multilateral for-
ums but also to the neglect of multilateral elements 
in favour of bilateral “deals”. 
Thus, while the FOIP on the one hand makes clear 
the Trump administration’s priorities and goals, it 
cannot, on the other hand, eliminate the divergences 
between the often normative FOIP rhetoric and the 
observable actions taken by the U.S. government – 
for example, with regard to its understanding of free 
trade and its sceptical attitude towards multilateral-
ism. 
 
37 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
(see note 12); The Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy 
Report (see note 13); The White House, National Security Strat-
egy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., December 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed 29 April 
2020). 
Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: 
From strategy to vision 
The term “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” was not coined 
by U.S. President Donald Trump but has its origins in 
a speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (see 
timeline on page 12). In 2007, during his first term 
in office, Abe delivered a speech entitled “Confluence 
of the Two Seas” to the Indian Congress. In it, he pre-
sented his vision of closer political and economic con-
nectivity between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 
It was a vision based on intensive cooperation among 
the democratic states of the region, which was to 
serve as the centre of a network spanning the entire 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific and make way for a 
“free flow of persons, goods, capital and knowledge” 
that would guarantee “freedom and prosperity”. Ac-
cording to Abe, the security of the shipping routes is 
of central strategic importance in this respect. Abe’s 
connectivity concept also emphasises “universal” 
norms, which are intended to closely link the democ-
racies in the region politically and economically and 
to regulate the behaviour of non-democratic states, 
above all China.38 
Abe’s connectivity concept 
emphasises “universal” norms that 
closely link the democracies in the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
In this context, Abe also proposed in 2007 to estab-
lish the Quad, consisting of Japan, Australia, India and 
the United States. However, Abe’s first term in office 
lasted only one year, so that the corresponding con-
cepts were only brought to life in his second term of 
office, which began in 2012. 
At the beginning of his second term as Prime Minis-
ter of Japan, Abe published an essay entitled “Asia’s 
Democratic Security Diamond” at the end of 2012, 
in which he revisited earlier ideas. In response to 
China’s “aggressive behaviour” in Asia, he proposed 
the formation of a democratic coalition composed of 
Japan, the United States, India and Australia to jointly 
protect global public goods, especially the freedom of 
 
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Speech by His 
Excellency Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the 
Parliament of the Republic of India ‘Confluence of the 
Two Seas’”, New Delhi, 22 August 2007, https://www.mofa. 
go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
The Indo-Pacific: Emergence, Objectives, Key Issues and Ideas on Regional Order 
SWP Berlin 
From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 
July 2020 
18 
navigation.39 This idea was again launched by Abe in a 
widely acclaimed speech in Nairobi in 2016, in which 
he spoke of a “union of two free and open oceans and 
two continents.”40 Subsequently it was given the label 
“FOIP Strategy”. 
The “FOIP Strategy”41 has since found its way into 
the official discourse and strategy papers of Japan. 
The alliance with the United States is still regarded 
as Japan’s security guarantee.42 The Japanese Foreign 
Ministry summarises the basic principles of FOIP in 
three core areas: First, maintaining a rules-based 
order, with the principles of free trade and freedom 
of navigation as its foundation; second, securing eco-
nomic prosperity through more physical connectivity 
through the development of infrastructure, more 
people-to-people connectivity through the expansion 
of exchange programs, and institutional connectivity 
through the harmonisation of global standards and 
rules; and third, maintaining peace and security 
through increased security cooperation with the 
United States, India, Australia and other partners. 
Concept, evolution and goals 
The above-mentioned core areas of the FOIP have 
remained unchanged since 2016, including the 
objective of preserving the freedom of navigation 
and the rules-based order for the entire Indo-Pacific. 
Accordingly, Abe described the waters of the Indo-
Pacific region as “public goods”43 that must be pro-
tected by compliance with international law, namely 
 
39 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, 
Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-
by-shinzo-abe (accessed 29 April 2020). 
40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Address by Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development”, 
Nairobi, 27 August 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/ 
page4e_000496.html (accessed 29 April 2020). 
41 Ash Rossiter, “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy 
and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture”, Rising Powers Quar-
terly 3, no. 2 (2018): 113–31. 
42 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering 
China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” International Affairs 
96, no. 1 (2020): 49–73 (57), https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz241 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
43 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech 
by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the 
Diet”, Tokyo, 22 January 2018, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/ 
98_abe/statement/201801/_00002.html (accessed 29 April 
2020). 
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).44 Without naming China specifically 
as an adversary, this emphasis and rhetoric illustrate 
the goal of containing Beijing.45 Geographically, 
Tokyo understands “Indo-Pacific” to span the entire 
area from the east coast of Africa to the American 
Pacific coast. 
Despite several constants, the “FOIP Strategy” has 
undergone some innovations since 2016. First of all, it 
was renamed “FOIP Vision” in September 2018. Since 
then, Japanese diplomats, as well as Prime Minister 
Abe, no longer speak of a “strategy” but of a “vision”. 
In addition to this relabeling, the orientation towards 
China has also changed in terms of content: If Tokyo 
used the FOIP until 2018 primarily as a containment 
strategy vis-à-vis China, especially with regard to Bei-
jing’s BRI, the rhetoric has changed since 2018. In a 
speech before the Japanese parliament, Abe indirectly 
alluded to the possibility that his FOIP vision and 
China’s BRI could coexist and complement each other 
and entertained the idea of cooperating closely with 
China in the field of infrastructure development in 
Asia in the future.46 So far, however, nothing has 
been publicly announced about the implementation 
of such projects. 
Since 2018, Japan has made an 
effort to avoid framing FOIP (any 
longer) as a containment strategy 
vis-à-vis China. 
At the same time, the importance of normative 
elements such as “democracy promotion” in the con-
text of FOIP has diminished.47 While the Diplomatic 
Bluebook 2017 stresses the importance of democracy, 
market economy and international law for maintain-
 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Remarks by Mr. 
Nobuo Kishi, State Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Indian 
Ocean Conference 2016”, Singapore, 7 October 2016, https:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000185853.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
45 Yoshihide Soeya, “Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision”, 
in CSCAP [Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific] 
Regional Security Outlook 2020, ed. Ron Huisken (Canberra: 
CSCAP, 2019), 16–19 (16). 
46 Prime Minister of Japan, “Policy Speech by Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet” (see note 43). 
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Address by Prime 
Minister Abe at the Seventy-Third Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly”, New York, 25 September 2018, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000926.html 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
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ing stability and prosperity in Asia,48 the Diplomatic 
Bluebook 2019 only mentions the latter aspect (inter-
national law) in the context of the FOIP.49 Then For-
eign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, for example, spoke 
in 2018 merely of a “free and open maritime order 
based on the rule of law”.50 
This gives the impression that since 2018 Japan has 
been trying to prevent its own interpretation of the 
FOIP from being perceived as a containment strategy 
towards China. According to observers, the reasons 
for this are twofold. On the one hand, relations be-
tween Japan and China have been warming up again 
since 2018.51 On the other hand, South and Southeast 
Asian partners have criticised the initiative launched 
by Abe; in their view, it was too strongly anti-Chinese 
and security policy oriented.52 
This change has been reflected in government 
documents and declarations identifying the key 
policy areas for FOIP: Whereas in 2016 and 2017 the 
FOIP was associated primarily with security policy 
threats, more recently aspects such as “connectivity”, 
“infrastructure expansion”, “national development” 
and “economic growth” have also been playing a role. 
Hard security policy issues, such as the maritime con-
flicts with China in the East and South China Seas or 
the expansion and modernisation of the Japanese 
armed forces, have receded somewhat into the back-
ground from 2018 onwards.53 
Concrete initiatives and implementation 
However, this shift is not only of a rhetorical nature; 
it is also reflected in the concrete initiatives thus far 
 
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 
2017. Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2016 
(Tokyo, 2017), 27. 
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 
2019. Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2018 
(Tokyo, 2019), 28. 
50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Foreign Policy 
Speech by Foreign Minister Kono to the 196th Session of 
the Diet”, Tokyo, 22 January 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
fp/unp_a/page3e_000816.html (accessed 29 April 2020). 
51 Stephen R. Nagy, “Japan’s Precarious Indo-Pacific 
Balance”, The Japan Times, 14 November 2019, https://www. 
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/14/commentary/japan-
commentary/japans-precarious-indo-pacific-balance/ 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
52 Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question” (see note 42). 
53 Prime Minister of Japan, “Policy Speech by Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet” (see note 43). 
planned or launched by Japan as part of FOIP. The 
vast majority of these projects are related to Tokyo’s 
declared goal of optimising connectivity between the 
two oceans. This specifically means expanding trade 
and investment through improved infrastructure.54 
The ADB estimated in 2015 that Asia would need 
$26 trillion in infrastructure investment over the 
course of the following 15 years. Under Abe’s Partner-
ship for Quality Infrastructure initiative, Tokyo has ear-
marked $200 billion for projects from Africa to the 
South Pacific. Japanese “Quality Infrastructure” proj-
ects are designed to offer states in the region a fairer, 
more transparent, efficient and sustainable alter-
native to Chinese infrastructure projects.55 
Corresponding Japanese projects include “soft loans” 
for port facilities in Mozambique ($230 million), Kenya 
($300 million) and Madagascar ($400 million); the 
construction of a “trans-harbour link” in Mumbai, 
India, for $2.2 billion; a container terminal in Yan-
gon, Myanmar, for $200 million; and a port with a 
special economic zone in Dawei, Myanmar, for $800 
million. In Cambodia, Japan has contributed over 
$200 million to the expansion of the container port in 
Sihanoukville.56 Finally, Japanese investors in south-
ern Bangladesh are to build the port in Matarbari. 
In addition, “Quality Infrastructure” projects can 
also be found in the railway sector. Japan is financing 
80 percent ($8 billion) of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad 
line, on which high-speed trains are to run after com-
pletion, and in Thailand the Bangkok-Chiang Mai line 
is to be upgraded with Japanese investment. The con-
struction of roads, as in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 
 
54 Axel Berkofsky, Tokyo’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Quality 
infrastructure and defence to the fore, ARI (Analyses of the Elcano 
Royal Institute) 34/2019 (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, 14 
March 2019), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/ 
rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elc
ano_in/zonas_in/ari34-2019-berkofsky-tokyos-free-and-open-
indo-pacific-quality-infrastructure-defence-fore (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
55 Tomohiro Osaki, “In blow to China, Japan’s ‘quality 
infrastructure’ to get endorsement at Osaka G20”, The Japan 
Times Online, 25 June 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 
news/2019/06/25/business/economy-business/blow-china-
japans-quality-infrastructure-get-endorsement-osaka-g20/ 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
56 Chhut Bunthoeun, “Japan to Provide $1.8m in Aid to 
Expand Port”, Khmer Times, 30 May 2019, https://www.khmer 
timeskh.com/609009/japan-to-provide-1-8m-in-aid-to-expand-
port/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
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or of power stations, as in Tanzania and India, is also 
being promoted. 
As part of the “Japan-Mekong Connectivity Initia-
tive”, work began in 2016 to establish an economic 
corridor that will run from the Vietnamese port of Da 
Nang via Laos and Thailand to Myanmar. Japan is also 
financing an economic corridor further south, linking 
Ho Chi Minh City in southern Vietnam and Dawei in 
Myanmar. Last but not least, Tokyo announced at the 
end of 2019 its intention to participate in the EU’s 
Asia Connectivity Strategy. 
In terms of trade policy, Tokyo has taken the lead 
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agree-
ment since the United States withdrew from the 
agreement in 2017. In March 2018, the eleven re-
maining states signed the free trade agreement in 
Tokyo, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
Japan has also played an important role in previous 
rounds of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship (RCEP) negotiations.57 This regional free trade 
agreement is intended to include China and India, 
among others; India, however, broke off negotiations 
in 2019. The free trade agreement with the EU (Japan-
EU Economic Partnership Agreement) must also be 
mentioned. 
In addition to promoting “Quality Infrastructure” 
and trade policy initiatives, Japan has underlined its 
importance as a key donor country in the field of 
development cooperation. The focus of the White 
Paper on Development Cooperation 2017 directly follows 
the priorities of the FOIP strategy.58 Tokyo has in-
creased its development funds since 2016 – in some 
cases substantially – for projects in countries in the 
West and South Pacific, Southeast and South Asia as 
well as Africa. 
At the security and defence policy level, Japan’s 
focus has been on strengthening its military alliance 
with the United States and reviving the Quad. In 
addition, bilateral dialogues in security and defence 
policy have been expanded; for example, in October 
2018 India and Japan initiated regular “2+2” dia-
logues (between their respective foreign and defence 
 
57 RCEP: an agreement between the ten ASEAN countries 
and the six partner countries China, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand and India. 
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s International 
Cooperation. White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017 
(Tokyo, 2018), https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page22e_ 
000860.html (accessed 29 April 2020). 
ministers). In this context, negotiations were 
launched in 2018 on an Acquisition and Cross-Ser-
vicing Agreement (ACSA), which is intended to facil-
itate the mutual use of military bases for logistical 
purposes (food, ammunition and fuel), as well as joint 
manoeuvres, with the possibility of including third 
countries such as the United States. 
In recent years, the navies and coast guards of 
Japan, India, Australia and the United States have 
conducted a series of joint manoeuvres and exercises 
in the South China Sea. Naval exercises have also been 
conducted with some ASEAN states, such as Vietnam. 
Japanese warships have called at ports in India, 
Sri Lanka, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Defence policy training of partners is also part of 
Japan’s security policy initiatives in the context of 
FOIP; the country has, for example, donated coast 
guard patrol boats to Sri Lanka, Vietnam and the 
Philippines. At the diplomatic level, bilateral collabo-
ration with India, the United States, Australia and 
other partners has dominated, though there have 
been some smaller multilateral initiatives, such 
as Tokyo’s support for the Pacific Islands Leaders 
Meeting (PALM). 
Ideas on regional order 
The transition of the Japanese FOIP from strategy 
to vision, along with Japan’s focus on infrastructure 
projects, trade policy initiatives and development 
cooperation, make it evident that Tokyo’s current 
interpretation and implementation of the FOIP is 
driven by economic ideas and initiatives rather than 
by security policy. It is clear that from a Japanese 
perspective FOIP is in many respects also intended to 
provide an alternative to China’s BRI, though Tokyo 
has gradually warmed up to BRI from 2018 onwards. 
It is notable that Tokyo has always avoided aggres-
sively presenting its FOIP vision as a containment 
strategy towards China. 
Tokyo has so far refrained from securitising its 
relations with its big neighbour, despite its concerns 
about China’s foreign policy ambitions and the do-
mestic political changes in the country (including the 
Uyghur problem and Hong Kong). For the time being, 
the economic interdependencies between Tokyo and 
Beijing appear too close. In this respect, Tokyo’s inter-
pretation of FOIP differs markedly from that of 
Washington and Canberra. 
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Many aspects of Japan’s FOIP vision 
seem like a makeover of old foreign 
policy principles and approaches. 
In this respect, many aspects of the FOIP vision 
seem like a makeover of old Japanese foreign policy 
principles and approaches, with emphasis placed on 
long-established principles such as the rules-based 
international order, the protection of free trade and 
the centrality of Japan’s alliance with the United 
States. Observers have called on Japan to develop its 
own vision of regional order in order to facilitate its 
transition from a “rules promoter” to a “rules maker”. 
This hardly seems feasible within the framework of 
Japan’s current FOIP vision.59 
Australia and the Indo-Pacific as a 
solid regional reference framework 
For Australia, the Indo-Pacific has become the regional 
frame of reference for its own geographical and stra-
tegic positioning since 2013; the term “Indo-Pacific” 
is firmly anchored in official documents. It was used 
as early as 2012 in a government White Paper, but only 
twice, to denote a geographical arc spanning the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.60 The Australian 
Defence White Paper of 2013,61 in contrast, devotes 
an entire chapter to the concept (with a total of 56 
mentions). Its use continues in the Defence White 
Paper of 201662 and the Foreign Policy White Paper 
of 2017.63 Since then, the concept has been a central 
 
59 Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question” (see note 42), 72. 
60 Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century. 
White Paper (Canberra, October 2012), 80, https://www. 
defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_asian_
century_white_paper.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
61 Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2013 
Defence White Paper (Canberra, 2013), https://www.defence. 
gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
62 Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2016 
Defence White Paper (Canberra, 2016), https://www.defence. 
gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
63 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. 
Opportunity, Security, Strength (Canberra, November 2017), 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-
white-paper.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
theme in speeches by politicians64 and is also dis-
cussed in academic circles. 
In 2012, Rory Medcalf, one of Australia’s best-
known security policy experts, presented a ground-
breaking article on the term “Indo-Pacific”.65 In recent 
years, academic texts on Australia’s strategic position-
ing have focused on the Sino-American conflict, power 
shifts in the region and the rules-based international 
order – all of which are discussed within the frame-
work of the Indo-Pacific.66 Two predominant tradi-
tions in Australia’s foreign policy are highlighted in 
these texts, both of which employ the concept of 
“Indo-Pacific”: Australia as a middle power on the one 
hand; and as a “dependent ally” of the United States 
on the other.67 
Concept, evolution and goals 
When Rory Medcalf’s revised article was published 
in 2013, the terminology was still in flux, because in 
American politics the term “Asia-Pacific” was still pre-
dominantly used. For Medcalf, the term “Indo-Pacific” 
 
64 Prime Minister of Australia, “‘Where We Live’ Asialink 
Bloomberg Address”, Sydney, 26 June 2019, https://www. 
pm.gov.au/media/where-we-live-asialink-bloomberg-address 
(accessed 29 April 2020); Minister of Defence Senator Linda 
Reynolds, Speech at the18th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019 
[International Institute for Strategic Studies], Singapore, 2 
June 2019, https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/ 
shangri-la-dialogue-2019 (accessed 29 April 2020); Secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Frances 
Adamson, “Shaping Australia’s Role in Indo-Pacific Security 
in the Next Decade”, Canberra, 2 October 2018, https:// 
dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/shaping-australias-role-in-
indo-pacific-security-in-the-next-decade.aspx (accessed 29 
April 2020); Idem., “The Indo-Pacific: Australia’s Perspec-
tive”, Kuala Lumpur, 29 April 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/ 
news/speeches/Pages/the-indo-pacific-australias-perspective 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
65 Rory Medcalf, “Indo-Pacific: What in a Name?” The In-
terpreter (Lowy Institute), 16 August 2012, https://archive. 
lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indo-pacific-what-name 
(accessed 29 April 2020). A revised version was published 
under the title “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?” The 
American Interest 9, no. 2 (2013), https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2013/10/10/the-indo-pacific-whats-in-a-name/ 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
66 A critical assessment of Australian rhetoric and practice 
can be found in Brendan Taylor, “Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific 
Strategy an Illusion?” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 
95–109. 
67 Ibid., 95. 
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makes sense: East Asia and South Asia can no longer 
be considered separately, and the maritime domain 
has become increasingly important for trade and 
competition. Particularly in view of the growing 
dependence of China, Japan and India on the Middle 
East and Africa, Medcalf sees the Indo-Pacific as a geo-
economic reality that was acknowledged as early as 
2005, when India was included in the first East Asia 
Summit (EAS). The Indo-Pacific region is not charac-
terised by a uniform security architecture, however, 
but rather by a multitude of regional, minilateral and 
bilateral formats.68 
Australia’s interpretation of the Indo-Pacific has 
evolved. In 2013 it was seen as an “emerging” region 
and a natural extension of the “wider Asia-Pacific 
region”. By 2016/2017 the Indo-Pacific had become a 
fixed regional reference point for Australia’s foreign, 
economic and security policy. Geographically, the 
area extends “from the eastern Indian Ocean to the 
Pacific Ocean, linked by Southeast Asia, including 
India, North Asia and the United States”.69 
Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept 
puts maritime Southeast Asia 
at the centre. 
Official Australian documents always refer to the 
central position of maritime Southeast Asia as a link 
and bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
thereby reassuring the ASEAN states that ASEAN is 
to remain central within the new construct. This is 
not least due to the fact that Indonesia has been and 
remains one of Australia’s most important partners 
in the region. Thus for Australia, too, long-standing 
priorities in foreign policy (Indonesia, Timor-Leste, 
Papua New Guinea) continue to exist under the new 
frame of reference. 
Australia sees two things as crucial for the stability 
of the Indo-Pacific: the continued presence of the 
United States and the commitment of the regional 
states to a rules-based order. Government documents 
speak of a “secure, open, prosperous Indo-Pacific 
region”, i.e. they do not adopt the U.S. formulation 
of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). Australia is 
pragmatic, says the 2017 White Paper on Foreign 
Policy; it does not want to impose its values on others 
 
68 Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?” 
(see note 65). 
69 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
(see note 63), footnote on p. 1. 
but is also determined to stand up for liberal institu-
tions, universal values and human rights.70 To this 
end, Australia wants to work more closely with the 
major democracies in the region, bilaterally and in 
small groups. 
Apart from the United States, Japan, Indonesia, 
India and South Korea are explicitly mentioned here, 
as are regional organisations and minilateral formats 
such as the EAS, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meet-
ing Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the Indian Ocean Rim Asso-
ciation (IORA). The growing trilateral cooperation 
with the United States and Japan on the one hand 
and with Japan and India on the other is also empha-
sised. In contrast, the Quad, i.e. the security coopera-
tion among these four states – initiated as early as 
2007 but only short-lived and revived in 2017 – is 
not prominently mentioned in the official documents. 
For Australia, the presence of the 
United States in the region and their 
alliance remains very important. 
For Australia, the presence of the United States in 
the region and their bilateral alliance remain essen-
tial as a stabilising force. This was also expressed in 
the speech by Australian Defence Minister Linda Rey-
nolds at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2019 in Singapore. 
In her speech, she underlined that China should 
make more contributions to peace and stability.71 
Concrete initiatives and implementation 
In June 2019, Reynolds outlined a number of concrete 
contributions that Australia was making, particularly 
in the South Pacific (infrastructure and patrol boats) 
and in maritime Southeast Asia (military training and 
education for 1,000 participants each year, strategic 
defence dialogues with all ASEAN states, and the an-
nual “Indo-Pacific Endeavour” military exercise since 
2017).72 
There are also joint infrastructure initiatives with 
the United States (Australia-United States Ministerial 
Consultations, July 2018) and with the United States 
 
70 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
(see note 63), 11. 
71 Minister of Defence Senator Linda Reynolds, Speech at 
the 18th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (see note 64). 
72 Ibid. 
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and Japan (since November 2018),73 with a geographi-
cal focus on a number of islands in the South Pacific 
and Papua New Guinea (April 2019).74 At the APEC 
summit in Papua New Guinea in 2018, Australia and 
the United States announced plans for the joint ex-
pansion of the Lombrum naval base on the island of 
Manus.75 In November 2019, the United States, Japan 
and Australia announced the “Blue Dot Initiative” in 
the margins of the ASEAN summit.76 A statement to 
this effect by the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration (OPIC), however, went into little more detail 
than a statement made a year earlier.77 
Australia’s infrastructure cooperation with the 
United States and Japan emphasises quality (“global 
gold standard”), transparency, sustainability, private 
sector involvement and debt avoidance78 – in con-
trast to China’s BRI, which has been criticised in par-
ticular for driving other countries into a debt trap and 
failing to comply with any of the above standards.79 
 
73 Australian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, “US, Japan, Australia Reaffirm Commitment to Indo-
Pacific Infrastructure Development”, Media Release, Tokyo, 
25 June 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/us-japan-
australia-reaffirm-commitment-to-indo-pacific-infrastruc 
ture-development.aspx (accessed 29 April 2020). 
74 One concrete project involves submarine cables connect-
ing Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. 
See David Brewster, “A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and 
What It Means for Australia”, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 
7 March 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ 
free-and-open-indo-pacific-and-what-it-means-australia 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
75 Taylor, “Is Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy an Illusion?” 
(see note 66), 108. 
76 On Security cooperation with the United States and 
Japan see also the section “Concrete initiatives and imple-
mentation” in the chapters on the United States (p. 12ff.) and 
Japan (p. 16ff.). 
77 For a critical evaluation of the “Blue Dot” initiative see 
Peter McCawley, “Connecting the Dots on the Blue Dot Net-
work”, The Interpreter (Lowy Institute), 12 November 2019, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/connecting-
dots-blue-dot-network (accessed 29 April 2020). 
78 See Jeffrey Wilson, “Diversifying Australia’s Indo-Pacific 
Infrastructure Diplomacy”, Australian Outlook (Australian 
Institute of International Affairs), 16 April 2019, http://www. 
internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/diversifying-
australias-indo-pacific-infrastructure-diplomacy/ (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
79 On joint initiatives with the United States in the area of 
infrastructure see also the section “Concrete initiatives and 
implementation” in the chapter on the United States 
(p. 12ff.). 
Finally, the “New Colombo Plan”, which was 
launched as early as 2014, enables young Australians 
to study or take part in internships in a total of 40 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region.80 
Ideas on regional order 
Australia’s stated goal is to maintain a rules-based 
order that will provide for lasting peace in the Indo-
Pacific region – a region where the rights of all are 
respected and open markets allow the free flow of 
goods, capital and ideas.81 Official documents empha-
sise that it is not in Australia’s interest (nor in the 
interest of other states in the region) to stand by and 
watch the Sino-American relationship to continue 
to deteriorate, as this would cause collateral damage. 
Faced with the prospect of having to choose at some 
point between the United States as a security partner 
and China as a principal economic partner, Canberra 
prefers to maintain the status quo. And although the 
status quo is becoming more complex and increasingly 
contested, Australia is confident that the situation 
need not get out of control if everyone acts in their 
own interests. 
Despite Donald Trump’s disruptive policies, the 
alliance with the United States has not really been 
called into question, while relations with other 
democracies and central powers in the Indo-Pacific, 
notably Japan, appear to be secondary to maintaining 
common rules. Australia’s vision of the Indo-Pacific 
puts ASEAN at the centre as a narrow geographical 
frame of reference for Australian foreign and security 
policy. For this reason, the “ASEAN Outlook on the 
Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) is explicitly supported.82 
India’s “Act East” policy and the 
Indo-Pacific 
The Indo-Pacific experienced one of its constitutive 
moments in India in August 2007, when Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his speech to 
 
80 Australian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, “About the New Colombo Plan” [n.d.], https://dfat.gov. 
au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan/about/Pages/about. 
aspx (accessed 29 April 2020). 
81 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
(see note 63), 4. 
82 Prime Minister of Australia, “‘Where We Live’” 
(see note 64). On ASEAN and the “Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific” see the next subchapter (p. 23). 
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parliament on the “confluence of the two seas”.83 
Nevertheless, very few official Indian documents on 
the Indo-Pacific have been issued to date, although it 
should be noted that the Indian government does not 
publish white papers on foreign or defence policy. A 
more specific document, the Indian Maritime Security 
Strategy of 2015, refers in its introduction to a shift in 
global focus from the “Euro-Atlantic” to the “Indo-
Pacific” and links the latter concept to India’s “Act 
East” policy.84 The National Security Strategy, commis-
sioned by the Indian opposition party Congress and 
published in March 2019, also mentions “Indo-
Pacific” seven times. Among other things, it calls for 
priority to be given to harmonizing the various views 
of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework.85 
Representatives of Indian think tanks regularly 
discuss both the term “Indo-Pacific” and India’s 
handling of it; they have also identified contradic-
tions and ambiguities in India’s strategy.86 India’s 
“Look East” policy (since 1991) and later “Act East” 
policy (since 2014), with its focus on Southeast Asia, 
fits into the wider Indo-Pacific framework, with 
priority given to strategic and security aspects over 
economic issues.87 
Traditional pillars of Indian 
foreign policy play a central role 
in the interpretation of the 
Indo-Pacific concept. 
Traditional pillars of Indian foreign policy, i.e. non-
alignment and strategic autonomy, play a decisive 
 
83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Abe Speech ‘Con-
fluence of the Two Seas’” (see note 38). 
84 Overall the term “Indo-Pacific” appears six times here. 
See Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security 
Strategy, Naval Strategic Publication 1.2 (New Delhi, October 
2015), https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/ 
Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2020). In contrast, the previous document 
of 2009 did not mention the “Indo-Pacific”. 
85 India’s National Security Strategy, March 2019, 11, https:// 
manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda. 
pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
86 See, e.g., Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Evasive Balancing: India’s 
Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy”, International Affairs 96, no. 1 
(2020): 75–93. 
87 Ibid., 78. 
role in India’s interpretation of the Indo-Pacific con-
cept.88 
Although it is officially not openly formulated and 
often even explicitly denied, China is seen as the real 
driving force behind India’s Indo-Pacific concept, just 
as India’s large northeastern neighbour is the un-
spoken central theme of Indian foreign policy. Three 
factors are relevant here: India perceives China’s 
policy as “strategic encirclement”; it is concerned 
about the freedom of navigation in the South China 
Sea; and it is alarmed about China’s strong military 
presence in the Indian Ocean (e.g. under the guise 
of fighting piracy).89 
Concept, evolution and goals 
In December 2015, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe visited India and signed a Joint Declaration with 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on India’s and 
Japan’s vision for 2025, the “Special Strategic and 
Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and 
Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World”.90 
The next time Abe visited India in September 2017, a 
second Joint Declaration followed, entitled “Toward 
a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”.91 In the 
paragraph on the common defence of the rules-based 
order, it was stated that India’s “Act East” policy could 
 
88 See, e.g., Nidhi Prasad, India’s Foray into the Indo-Pacific: 
Embracing Ambiguity through Strategic Autonomy, 2019, https:// 
www.ide.go.jp/library/Japanese/Publish/Download/Report/2018/
pdf/2018_2_40_011_ch07.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
89 Rajagopalan, “Evasive Balancing” (see note 86), 79. The 
author describes India’s policy as “evasive balancing”, i.e. 
India tries to strengthen security cooperation with other 
states in the region while at the same time assuring Beijing 
that this is not directed against China. 
90 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint 
Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic 
and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and 
Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World”, New 
Delhi, 12 December 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and 
_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partners
hip_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the 
IndoPacific_R (accessed 29 April 2020). 
91 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan–India Joint 
Statement. Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”, 
Gandhinagar, 14 September 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
files/000289999.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
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be aligned with Japan’s strategy92 of a “free and open 
Indo-Pacific” by developing maritime security co-
operation, improving connectivity in the wider Indo-
Pacific region, strengthening cooperation with 
ASEAN, and conducting regular exchanges between 
strategists and experts from the two countries. 
In June 2018 Prime Minister Modi was invited to 
deliver the opening speech and keynote address at 
the Shangri-La Security Conference in Singapore. 
This speech93 is still considered an important refer-
ence point for India’s understanding of the Indo-
Pacific concept. The United States expected Modi to 
make a strong commitment to the “Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific” (FOIP),94 but instead he focused his re-
marks on ASEAN, spoke of security and growth for 
the entire region, and emphasised India’s involve-
ment in the regional ASEAN-centred organisations 
(EAS, ADMM-Plus). In addition to Southeast Asia, 
Modi highlighted India’s transformed relationship 
with Japan and new impetus in relations with South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. 
He also referred to India’s intensified relations with 
Africa, a development manifested, for example, in a 
summit with African states.95 India’s strategic part-
nership with Russia was cited as a demonstration of 
India’s strategic autonomy (both states advocating a 
strong multipolar world order). Modi said that India’s 
global strategic partnership with the United States 
had overcome earlier hesitations and reservations, 
and that the two countries shared the vision of an 
open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific. India’s rela-
tionship with China was characterised as the most 
complex, with trade on the rise and both countries 
 
92 At that time in Japan the term “strategy” was still used; 
from September 2018 onwards it was called “vision” (see 
chapter on Japan, p. 15ff). 
93 For the full text of Modi’s speech see Ministry of Exter-
nal Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Keynote 
Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, Singapore, 1 June 2018, 
https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/ 
Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_ 
June_01_2018 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
94 Discussions of GW on the fringes of the Shangri-La Dia-
logue. 
95 India’s definition of the geographical extent of the Indo-
Pacific thus most closely matches that of France. On India 
and Africa see in detail Christian Wagner, India’s Africa Policy, 
SWP Research Paper 9/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, July 2019), doi: 10.18449/2019RP09. 
taking a responsible approach to border issues.96 One 
central assertion made in the speech was that India 
saw the Indo-Pacific region neither as a strategy nor 
as an exclusive club or a group striving for domi-
nance or aligned against a single country. 
Concrete initiatives and implementation 
While the Indian government is reserved in its rheto-
ric and advocates an inclusive version of the Indo-
Pacific, a number of steps have been taken to build 
a counterweight to China (“soft balancing”, “evasive 
balancing”97). Some of these steps were initiated 
before the Indo-Pacific became the frame of reference. 
For India the focus is on intensifying security co-
operation with the United States, Japan and Australia 
as well as with some states in Southeast Asia (Viet-
nam, Singapore and Indonesia).98 India’s navy cooper-
ates with states in the region in joint exercises, in-
cluding in the field of Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief (HADR). Since 2015 Japan has also 
regularly participated in the maritime “Malabar” 
military exercise, which has existed since the 1990s 
and was initially conducted bilaterally between India 
and the United States. India and Indonesia share a 
common vision of maritime cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific. 
Although India claims it is seeking economic or 
free trade agreements with the region within the 
framework of the Indo-Pacific concept, it withdrew 
from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship (RCEP) in November 2019. The main reason for 
this withdrawal was the fear of an even higher trade 
deficit with China and of nationalist resistance at 
home.99 
 
96 The Security dialogue in Singapore took place a few 
days after an informal meeting between Modi and Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in Wuhan. The talks between the two 
leaders also focused on the disputed land border between 
the two countries, where there had been clashes the pre-
vious year. 
97 Rajagopalan, “Evasive Balancing” (see note 86). 
98 On Security cooperation with the United States and 
Japan see also the section “Concrete initiatives and imple-
mentation” in the chapters on the United States (p. 12ff.) and 
Japan (p. 16ff.). 
99 Mie Oba, “The Implications of India’s RCEP Withdrawal”, 
The Diplomat, 14 November 2019, https://thediplomat.com/ 
2019/11/the-implications-of-indias-rcep-withdrawal/ (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
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As India is critical of China’s BRI, it has been pur-
suing infrastructure partnerships within the Indo-
Pacific concept, especially with Japan (projects in 
India and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor).100 Like 
the North-South Corridor (with Russia and Iran), 
these partnerships are designed as alternatives to 
BRI. However, there are considerable obstacles to the 
realisation of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.101 So 
far, India is not participating in the “Blue Dot Initia-
tive” of the United States, Japan and Australia. 
Ideas on regional order 
Modi’s speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Security Con-
ference clearly outlined a vision of the Indo-Pacific 
that is oriented towards the status quo. He did not 
question the centrality of ASEAN and stressed the 
importance of establishing a free, open and inclusive 
region where all powers abide by the rules. He em-
phasised that equal access to sea and airspace on 
the basis of international law was essential and that 
connectivity played an important role while also 
insisting on the observance of certain principles such 
as transparency and the avoidance of debt. Modi 
stressed, however, that such ideas presupposed that 
there could be no return to great power rivalry and 
that India’s friendships were not “alliances of con-
tainment”. Indirectly, criticism of China can be seen 
here, albeit in a veiled form, both regarding the 
demand for “equal access” for all and on the issue 
of connectivity. 
The basic dilemma of Indian foreign 
policy continues to lie in striking a 
balance between conflict and 
cooperation with China. 
The main goal of Indian policy in the Indo-Pacific 
is to prevent China from dominating the region. 
Experts interpret India’s policy as an essential com-
ponent of a policy of counterbalancing China, even if 
India’s government is at the same time signalling its 
 
100 On joint initiatives with Japan in the field of infra-
structure see also the section “Concrete initiatives and im-
plementation” in the chapter on Japan (p. 16ff.). 
101 See Aman Thakker and Elliot Silverberg, “India and 
Japan Eye the Dragon in the Room”, Foreign Policy, 20 Novem-
ber 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/20/china-war-
navy-india-japan-eye-dragon-in-the-room/ (accessed 29 April 
2020). 
willingness to cooperate with its neighbour.102 This is 
demonstrated not least by its membership in organi-
sations that China has played a key role in initiating 
or shaping, such as the BRICS group of states103 with 
its development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB), and the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation (SCO). The basic dilemma of Indian foreign 
policy continues to lie in striking a balance between 
conflict and cooperation with China, i.e. between pre-
serving credibility with India’s actual Indo-Pacific 
partners (the United States, Japan and Australia) on 
the one hand and simultaneously maintaining con-
structive relations with China on the other. 
The “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” 
Until June 2019, the term “Indo-Pacific” was not used 
in official ASEAN statements and documents. How-
ever, it must be mentioned in this context that the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry presented concrete ideas 
for an “Indo-Pacific Friendship and Cooperation Treaty” 
as early as May 2013. This treaty was presented by 
then Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa as a possible 
new foreign policy “paradigm”. It was designed to 
address the changing geopolitical and geo-economic 
framework of the region and to contain the resultant 
interstate rivalries. Security in Asia was to be under-
stood as a jointly administered public good to be safe-
guarded by the Indo-Pacific Friendship and Coopera-
tion Treaty.104 However, the initiative was met with 
little enthusiasm outside Indonesia at the time. 
Thus, even though ideas on the Indo-Pacific have 
been circulating within ASEAN for years, at least 
internally, the “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP), 
which appeared in June 2019, can primarily be seen 
as a reply to the Trump administration’s FOIP strategy 
and to the responses of other states in the region such 
as Australia, Japan and India. 
The ASEAN states felt compelled to launch their 
own vision of the Indo-Pacific in order to be able to 
 
102 See Rajagopalan, “Evasive Balancing” (see note 86), 
91ff. 
103 Consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. 
104 CSIS, “An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific. 
Keynote Address by His Excellency Dr. R. M. Marty M. Nata-
legawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia”, 
Washington, D.C., 16 May 2013, http://csis.org/files/ 
attachments/130516_MartyNatalegawa_Speech.pdf (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
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intervene in regional debates on the Indo-Pacific. 
Behind this lie, on the one hand, historical factors, 
such as the fear that ASEAN states could become the 
playground of great powers or the desire to establish 
ASEAN as a central anchor of regional security co-
operation (ASEAN centrality);105 but current factors 
also play a role, including concerns about the nega-
tive political and economic effects an escalation of 
the Sino-American rivalry could have on ASEAN.106 
The states of Southeast Asia, partly because of their 
geographical location between the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific Ocean, felt impelled to challenge the com-
peting ideas of order of the two great powers, China 
(BRI) and the United States (FOIP), by formulating 
their own response. 
Concept, evolution and goals 
According to the AOIP, ASEAN’s main interest is to 
determine its own economic and security structures, 
thereby ensuring that they bring “peace, security, 
stability and prosperity to the people of Southeast 
Asia”.107 Against this background, ASEAN defines 
“Indo-Pacific” less as a territorially clearly delineated 
(geopolitical) space, but rather as an interdependent, 
closely linked region without clearly defining its 
borders yet with ASEAN placed at its centre. “Dia-
logue and cooperation instead of rivalry” and “devel-
opment and prosperity for all” are also stressed as 
essential elements.108 
ASEAN’s outlook represents an 
inclusive understanding of the Indo-
Pacific as a connectivity concept open 
to all states in the region. 
This emphasis is based on an inclusive understand-
ing of “Indo-Pacific” as a connectivity concept that 
is unequivocally open to all states in the region, in-
 
105 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order 
in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies”, 
International Security 32, no. 3 (2008): 113–57, https://doi.org/ 
10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.13 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
106 Jonathan Stromseth, Don’t Make Us Choose. Southeast Asia 
in the Throes of US-China Rivalry (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, October 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/dont-make-us-choose-southeast-asia-in-the-throes-of-
us-china-rivalry/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
107 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (Bangkok, 
23 June 2019), 1. 
108 Ibid., 2. 
cluding China. Accordingly, the document does not 
even mention a single country by name – neither 
the United States nor China nor other actors such 
as Japan, India or Russia.109 Other regional organisa-
tions, however, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Asso-
ciation (IORA) or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), are specifically listed as potential ASEAN 
partners. 
The document repeatedly underlines the inclusive 
nature of AOIP; furthermore, it does not include any 
military aspects.110 In this context it must be men-
tioned, however, that AOIP first and foremost consti-
tutes a kind of “lowest common denominator” at 
the regional level. Individual ASEAN members have 
responded quite differently to the initiatives of the 
major powers (BRI and FOIP). For example, Cambodia 
and Laos have very close economic and political ties 
to China. Indonesia, on the other hand, attaches im-
portance to preserving its strategic autonomy and 
the principle of ASEAN centrality vis-à-vis external 
actors.111 
The objectives laid down in the AOIP essentially 
reflect the well-known core principles of ASEAN: 
deepening of regional integration processes, main-
tenance of a rules-based regional order, peaceful 
conflict resolution, multilateralism, and strengthen-
ing international law. No objectives are mentioned 
that go beyond these core principles. Therefore, the 
AOIP also refrains from establishing new mechanisms 
or institutions. Instead, it focuses on strengthening 
ASEAN-led mechanisms such as EAS, ARF, ADMM-
Plus, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) 
and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).112 
The policy areas identified by the AOIP as signifi-
cant areas of cooperation include the maritime do-
main, connectivity under the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity (MPAC 2025), economic cooperation and 
cooperation to achieve the Sustainable Development 
 
109 Amitav Acharya, “Why ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook 
Matters”, East Asia Forum, 11 August 2019, https://www.east 
asiaforum.org/2019/08/11/why-aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-
matters/print/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Retno Marsudi, “Indonesia: Partner for Peace, Security, 
Prosperity”, The Jakarta Post, 11 January 2018, https://www. 
thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/01/10/full-text-indonesia-
partner-for-peace-security-prosperity.html (accessed 29 April 
2020). 
112 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (see note 107), 2. 
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Goals (SDGs).113 ASEAN should continue to play a 
“central role” in the evolving regional architecture 
of Southeast Asia. Only in this way can it guarantee 
inclusivity and act as an “honest broker” among com-
peting interests.114 So far, ASEAN has not launched 
any independent initiatives or projects as part of the 
AOIP. 
Ideas on regional order 
The contents and goals of the AOIP therefore offer 
little that is new: ASEAN has followed this same ap-
proach for decades. Neither in terms of its normative 
orientation nor in terms of the favoured cooperation 
mechanisms does it go beyond already existing ASEAN 
agendas. Critics have therefore complained that the 
AOIP contains no new strategic concept for dealing 
with the Sino-American great power rivalry, let alone 
new ideas for ordering the region. They argue that 
it is first and foremost an attempt by ASEAN and its 
member states to give themselves a voice in the in-
creasingly loud debate on the future of the region.115 
In the words of a leading Indonesian diplomat, the 
AOIP constitutes “a response to the growing challenges 
stemming from external pressures that could threaten 
ASEAN’s unity, undermine ASEAN’s relevance and 
corrode ASEAN’s centrality”.116 
Despite the use of the term “Indo-Pacific” in the 
title, the AOIP is by no means an endorsement of the 
FOIP. In contrast to the FOIP, the AOIP is not directed 
against China but includes all states in the region 
without exception. Moreover, because of its emphasis 
on the “ASEAN Way” and its inclusive orientation, 
the AOIP is unobjectionable to other actors and does 
not interfere with their interpretation of the Indo-
Pacific. 
 
113 Ibid., 3. 
114 Ibid., 1. 
115 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Assessing ASEAN’s New 
Indo-Pacific Outlook”, The Diplomat, 24 June 2019, https:// 
thediplomat.com/2019/06/assessing-aseans-new-indo-pacific-
outlook/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
116 Rizal Sukma, Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific: 
Strategic Necessities or Norm-Setting Exercise? (Jakarta: CSIS, 28 
August 2019), https://csis.or.id/events/indonesia-asean-and-
the-indo-pacific-strategic-necessities-or-norm-setting-exercise/ 
(accessed 29 April 2020). 
The AOIP is based on the idea of a 
multilateral, inclusive security 
architecture for the region with 
ASEAN at its centre. 
The ASEAN interpretation of the Indo-Pacific offers 
a conceptual space for all actors – provided they are 
willing to accept the multilateral regional security 
architecture with ASEAN at its core inherent in this 
interpretation. The AOIP appears to be ASEAN’s at-
tempt to respond to the concerns of many in South-
east Asia that the region could be split into two hos-
tile camps. As a result, the AOIP focuses primarily on 
general goals and norms rather than on concrete, 
practice-oriented proposals for resolving problems.117 
Consequently, the AOIP is primarily “an attempt to 
reclaim the geopolitical narrative amid the strategic 
rivalry between China and the United States”,118 an 
approach that is already bearing its first small fruits: 
Tokyo revised its FOIP concept at the end of 2018, 
adding a paragraph on the importance of regional, 
ASEAN-led multilateral organisations; and ASEAN 
was given prominent mention in connection with the 
Indo-Pacific in a Joint Statement by Prime Minister 
Modi and President Trump published during Trump’s 
recent visit to India.119 
Interim conclusions 
The comparative case analysis has shown that the 
term “Indo-Pacific” is now used by a whole range of 
actors with very different foreign and security policy 
traditions, doctrines and capacities; even the geo-
graphical definitions vary considerably (see map on 
 
117 Mie Oba, “ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Concept and the 
Great Power Challenge”, The Diplomat, 17 July 2019, https:// 
thediplomat.com/2019/07/aseans-indo-pacific-concept-and-
the-great-power-challenge/ (accessed 29 April 2020). 
118 Hui Yee Tan, “Asean Issues Collective Vision for Indo-
Pacific as It Attempts to Reclaim Geopolitical Narrative”, 
The Straits Times, 23 June 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/ 
asia/se-asia/asean-issues-collective-vision-for-indo-pacific-as-it-
attempts-to-reclaim-geopolitical (accessed 29 April 2020). 
119 The White House, “Joint Statement: Vision and Prin-
ciples for the United States–India Comprehensive Global 
Strategic Partnership”, Washington, D.C., 25 February 
2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
joint-statement-vision-principles-united-states-india-
comprehensive-global-strategic-partnership/ (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
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page 10). It is therefore not surprising that, despite 
similar uses of the term, interpretations and empha-
ses differ widely. In short, there are major differences 
between what, for example, the United States and 
ASEAN countries mean when they use the term 
“Indo-Pacific”. The Trump administration’s FOIP is 
resolutely opposed to China’s growing influence in 
the region and aims to contain it, while the AOIP 
of the ASEAN states directly includes China. 
The various conceptions or understandings are also 
clearly reflected in the corresponding priorities and 
initiatives. While one of Japan’s priorities is the con-
clusion of multilateral free trade agreements, for 
example, India views such efforts rather ambivalently 
and withdrew from the RCEP negotiations at the end 
of 2019. The Trump administration is also opposed 
to multilateral free trade agreements but is seeking to 
conclude bilateral agreements. 
Differences also exist in the weighting of individual 
policy areas. The strong focus on security and defence 
policy in Washington is particularly striking here, 
whereas Japan, Australia and India have so far at-
tached greater importance to areas such as infrastruc-
ture development and connectivity. This weighting is 
also reflected in the approaches chosen: All actors 
except ASEAN (which is concerned with maintaining 
its own centrality) have so far refrained from pur-
suing multilateral approaches to security policy, 
though all actors rhetorically stress the importance 
of existing regional forums such as ARF and EAS. In 
terms of infrastructure policy, the approaches chosen 
are mostly bi- or minilateral. In economic policy, on 
the other hand, all actors, with the exception of the 
United States and India, prefer predominantly multi-
lateral approaches. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also reveals some com-
monalities: All of the actors examined refer positively, 
at least in their rhetoric, to the rules-based inter-
national order and international norms, for example 
the freedom of navigation. Furthermore, all of them 
have committed themselves to improving the regional 
infrastructure and expanding connectivity, even if 
their weighting varies. With the exception of the 
United States, all actors directly or indirectly reject 
the securitisation of the Indo-Pacific, especially with 
regard to its economic dimension. Moreover, at least 
in the official documents, care is taken to avoid 
espousing concepts that are openly directed against 
China. For this reason, none of the actors under con-
sideration, apart from the United States, is striving 
for economic decoupling from China, at least for the 
time being. And in the area of security policy, with 
the exception of ASEAN, all countries involved favour 
“balancing” (some softer, some harder) vis-à-vis Bei-
jing. 
The various Indo-Pacific concepts 
contain very few new ideas on how to 
deal with the rise of China. 
Finally, the countries involved are united by the 
perception that the current status quo is fragile in 
many respects. Nevertheless, the various Indo-Pacific 
concepts provide few new ideas as to how China’s rise 
could be managed more robustly. In general, it can be 
said that “Indo-Pacific” is always primarily conceived 
by all actors as a response to the challenges associated 
with China’s rise. In its various forms, “Indo-Pacific” 
is therefore not to be understood at present as an in-
dependent new strategy or a vision of any kind of 
revised regional order. Even the FOIPs of Tokyo and 
Washington do not yet contain any new, concrete 
blueprints for the region. The term “Indo-Pacific”, 
with the exception of the open confrontation course 
pursued by the United States, reveals to some extent 
the feebleness of the actors when it comes to dealing 
with China. 
The table on page 30 provides an overview of the 
differences and similarities among the Indo-Pacific 
concepts of the actors studied. 
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Officially the term “Indo-Pacific” is not (yet) used in 
China and therefore does not appear in key docu-
ments, such as the Defence White Paper of July 
2019.120 The term has been used occasionally in Chi-
nese Foreign Ministry press conferences, but always 
exclusively by foreign journalists. Chinese officials 
consistently adhere to the expression “Asia-Pacific” 
in their answers. As late as March 2018, the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that the concept 
of the Indo-Pacific was as short-lived as the foam on 
the two seas.121 
As far as academic publications are concerned, 
until 2017 the “Indo-Pacific” was mentioned in 
relatively few articles (2016: 126; 2017: 202). From 
2018 onwards, however, its appearance has increased 
rapidly (2018: 793; 2019 to October: 612).122 It has 
apparently been accepted that this concept is not 
going to disappear anytime soon – at least not from 
the foreign and security policy vocabulary of the 
United States – and that it is important to gain a 
better grasp of the new construct. The majority of 
 
120 The State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, 
July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/ 
c138253389.htm (accessed 29 April 2020). The speech by 
Chinese Minister of National Defense, Wei Fenghe, at the 
2019 Shangri-La Dialogue also makes no mention of the 
term Indo-Pacific, see https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-
dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019 (accessed 29 April 2020). 
121 Quoted in Feng Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese 
Assertiveness: China’s Responses to the Indo-Pacific Chal-
lenge”, International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 9–27 (15–16). 
See also Feng Zhang, “China’s Curious Nonchalance towards 
the Indo-Pacific”, Survival 61, no. 3 (2019): 187–212. 
122 The figures are based on a search in the Crossasia portal 
and refer to publications in the subject area “politics, mili-
tary, law”. The figures quoted in the text above are the result 
of a full text search. If one narrows this down to articles in 
which “Indo-Pacific” appears in the title, the numbers are 
much smaller: 2017: 10; 2018: 86; 2019 until October: 54. 
academic papers published by think tanks and uni-
versities refer to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy; the 
roles of Japan, Australia and India are also regularly 
analysed. A number of texts compare the Indo-Pacific 
strategy with China’s own BRI. In Chinese media, 
articles by international policy experts also address or 
comment on the Indo-Pacific concept.123 A distancing 
from the term is already evident from the fact that it 
is placed in quotation marks in most Chinese publi-
cations. 
The perception of the Indo-Pacific 
in China 
Following Donald Trump’s announcement of the new 
geopolitical construct as an American strategy during 
his first trip to Asia in November 2017 in Vietnam 
(APEC summit), the reaction not only of the Chinese 
leadership but also of Chinese academics was initially 
reserved.124 Indeed, Chinese experts and scientists see 
the concept as still in flux even two years after Trump’s 
announcement.125 Almost without exception, they 
 
123 See Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness” 
(see note 121), 16. 
124 Zhang, “China’s Curious Nonchalance” (see note 121), 
188, cites four reasons for the calm reaction in China: they 
have learned their lesson from the overreaction to rebalance/ 
pivot; they believe they have new strategic levers to counter 
such challenges; they have more financial resources for 
regional economic initiatives and are open to cooperation 
with third parties at BRI; they believe they have enough stra-
tegic space to navigate the treacherous waters of the Indo-
Pacific. 
125 See Dingding Chen, “What China Thinks of the Indo-
Pacific Strategy”, The Diplomat Magazine, 27 April 2018; Zhong 
Feiteng, “Zhongguo jueqi, Meiguo youxian yu Yin-Tai diqu 
zhixu de wangluohua” [China’s rise, America first, and the 
interconnectedness of the Indo-Pacific regional order], 
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interpret the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy as a reaction 
to global and regional power shifts and to China’s rise 
with its growing economic, political and military 
influence. 
From the Chinese perspective, 
Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy has 
replaced the Obama administration’s 
policy of “rebalancing” towards Asia. 
From the Chinese perspective, Trump’s strategy 
has replaced the Obama administration’s policy of 
“rebalancing” or reorientation towards Asia (“pivot 
to Asia”).126 For Chinese analysts, its goal is obvious: 
the United States is concerned with maintaining its 
supremacy in the region (and globally) and with slow-
ing down or containing China’s further rise.127 
Only a single article, albeit one that was published 
as early as 2013, manages to give the Indo-Pacific con-
cept a positive spin by highlighting common interests 
in the Indian Ocean, for example in the fight against 
piracy, and thus identifying an opportunity for co-
operation for China as well.128 
When comparing the FOIP and BRI, it is generally 
emphasised that the latter aims at development, 
 
Zhongguo Zhanlüe Baogao [Chinese Journal of Strategic Studies], 
no. 2 (2018): 81–104. 
126 See, e.g., Chao Mingwu, “Meiguo zheng fuyu ‘Yin-Tai 
zhanlüe’ shizhi neirong” [The United States is currently 
giving substantial content to the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”], 
Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], no. 5 (2019): 55–57; He Kai, 
“Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo de zhidu 
zhiheng” [The American Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s 
institutional balancing], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary 
International Relations], no. 1 (2019): 13–21. 
127 See, e.g., Zhu Cuiping, “Telangpu zhengfu ‘Yin-Tai’ 
zhanlüe jiqi dui Zhongguo anquan de yingxiang” [The Trump 
administration’s “Indo-Pacific” Strategy and its Implications 
for China’s Security], Nanya Yanjiu [South Asian Studies], 
no. 4 (2018): 1–17; Liu Wu and Liu Chengkai, “‘Yin-Tai’ 
zhanlüe dui Dongmeng zai Yatai diqu hezuo zhong ‘zhong-
xin diwei’ de yingxiang” [The impact of the “Indo-Pacific” 
strategy on ASEAN’s “centrality” in Asia-Pacific cooperation], 
Shehuizhuyi Yanjiu [Socialism Studies], no. 1 (2019): 133–40; 
Cai Penghong, “Meiguo dui Dongnanya ‘zaibaozhang’ 
zhengce xilun” [Analysis of American “Reassurance” policy 
towards Southeast Asia], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary 
International Relations], no. 1 (2019): 30–37. 
128 See Li Zhonglin, “‘Yin-Tai’ bing bu wanquan shi ge 
huai dongxi” [“Indo-Pacific” is not a totally bad thing], in: 
Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan [China Economic Weekly], 27 May 
2013, n. p. 
whereas “Indo-Pacific” focuses on security.129 The 
most obvious evidence of this dichotomy, according 
to Chinese observers, can be seen in the quadrilateral 
security format (Quad) formed by the United States, 
Japan, Australia and India, which was revived in 2017 
after a ten-year hiatus. From the Chinese perspective, 
the FOIP is a sign that the competition with China is 
moving away from the level of interests and power 
to a higher level where principles and order are at 
stake.130 
Chinese experts have identified various weaknesses 
in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Some doubt the will 
of the United States to provide the resources neces-
sary to implement the strategy, especially because 
since Trump’s inauguration Washington has been 
demanding more burden-sharing from its allies (above 
all Japan and South Korea).131 Others point out that 
each of the four protagonists – the United States, 
Japan, Australia and India – has their own distinct 
understanding of the Indo-Pacific concept; there is 
considerable variation not only in their geographical 
definition but also in their strategic objectives. This 
lack of a unified concept is seen as a further weak-
ness.132 
According to the Chinese assessment, India’s com-
mitment to the Indo-Pacific is particularly tenuous 
because India does not want to be instrumentalised 
by the United States, Japan and Australia. Chinese 
observers argue that India is not prepared to form an 
alliance simply because of its identity as a co-founder 
 
129 See, e.g., Jia Wenshan, “‘Yidai, yilu’ ji renlei mingyun 
gongtongti lilun huayu tixi de jiangou” [“One Belt, One 
Road” and the construction of the discourse system of the 
theory of the community of a shared destiny], in: Xinsilu 
Xuekan [Journal of New Silk Roadology], (2018) 3, n. p. The 
author praises the Chinese initiative, while describing the 
Indo-Pacific Alliance as a zero-sum game. 
130 See, e.g., Zhang Guihong, “‘Yidai, yilu’ changyi yu Yin-
Tai zhanlüe gouxiang de bijiao fenxi” [Comparative analysis 
of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the Indo-Pacific 
strategic concept], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary Inter-
national Relations], no. 2 (2019): 26–34 (26). 
131 See Zhong, “Zhongguo jueqi, Meiguo youxian yu Yin-
Tai diqu zhixu de wangluohua” (see note 125). 
132 See, e.g., He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu 
Zhongguo de zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126), 17; Zhong, 
“Zhongguo jueqi, Meiguo youxian yu Yin-Tai diqu zhixu 
de wangluohua” (see note 125); Miao Ji, “‘Yin-Tai’ shijiao 
xia de Ri-Yin guanxi” [Japan-India relations from the “Indo-
Pacific” perspective], Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World], 
no. 2 (2019): 10–15. 
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of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).133 They also 
see few signs of U.S. dominance in the Indian Ocean, 
citing as indicators the lack of allies and the absence 
of a strong military presence in the region – unlike 
in the Pacific and East Asia.134 
China sees the danger of regional 
isolation if the ASEAN states join the 
U.S.-led Indo-Pacific framework. 
Moreover, in the assessment of Chinese experts the 
states in the region do not (or not yet) perceive China 
as a common threat but rather as an opportunity for 
development, despite territorial disputes and diverg-
ing interests.135 At the same time, there is recognition 
that China could be isolated regionally if ASEAN were 
to join the Indo-Pacific framework.136 
The greatest weakness of the Indo-Pacific concept 
from the point of view of Chinese analysts is that 
it does not yet have a credible economic dimension/ 
pillar and therefore does not constitute a serious 
challenge to China’s attractiveness as a trade and 
investment partner (including within the framework 
of the BRI). This criticism applies above all to the 
United States, whose Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) 
focuses mainly on security. Due to the divergent eco-
nomic interests of the four main proponents of the 
Indo-Pacific, Chinese experts question the long-term 
viability of the concept.137 In this context, several 
publications point to the withdrawal of the United 
 
133 See He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo 
de zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126), 15. On India’s role in the 
Indo-Pacific see also Li Xiao, “Xueshujie guanyu Yindu ‘Yin-
Tai’ waijiao yanjiu shuping” [Commentary on academic 
research on India’s “Indo-Pacific” foreign policy], Shijie Jingji 
yu Zhengzhi Luntan [Forum of World Economics and Politics], 
no. 6 (2018): 62-81. 
134 See He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo 
de zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126), 15. 
135 See ibid. See also Liu and Liu, “‘Yin-Tai’ zhanlüe dui 
Dongmeng zai Yatai diqu hezuo zhong ‘zhongxin diwei’ de 
yingxiang” (see note 127); Ren Yuanze, “Telangpu zhengfu 
de Dongnanya zhengce jiexi” [Analysis of the Trump admin-
istration’s Southeast Asia policy], Meiguo Yanjiu [The Chinese 
Journal of American Studies], no. 1 (2019): 49-70; Cai, 
“Meiguo dui Dongnanya ‘zaibaozhang’ zhengce xilun” (see 
note 127). 
136 See He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo 
de zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126), 19. 
137 See, e.g., Yang Yishuang, “‘Yin-Tai’ de jingji luoji 
bianxi” [Differences in the economic logic of the “Indo-Pacif-
ic”], Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review], no. 2 (2019): 84–105. 
States from the TPP trade agreement. However, joint 
infrastructure initiatives between the United States 
and its partners in the region could potentially be-
come a real competitor to China’s BRI.138 Some 
analysts see the trade war between the United States 
and China, which has been escalating since 2018, 
as the real economic dimension of U.S. containment 
policy towards China.139 
Some Chinese experts argue that the key to the 
success or failure of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy lies 
with China itself and that if relations with neighbour-
ing countries deteriorate on all fronts, China could 
provoke the formation of an alliance against itself.140 
Accordingly, many articles make recommendations 
for Chinese policymakers on how to deal with the 
Indo-Pacific strategy. They include “splitting” the Quad 
(mainly by improving China’s relations with Japan 
and Australia); increasing Chinese involvement in 
Southeast Asia and in the ASEAN-centred organi-
sations (ASEAN+3, ASEAN 10+1, EAS, ARF);141 accel-
erating negotiations on the RCEP regional free trade 
agreement; actively opening the Chinese economy to 
strengthen existing interdependencies; and encourag-
ing Southeast Asian states (Indonesia, ASEAN as a 
whole) to join the Indo-Pacific concept, thus weaken-
ing U.S. influence on decision-making. Finally, China 
is urged to actively seek involvement in the Quad 
members’ infrastructure initiatives.142 
 
138 He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo de 
zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126), 19. 
139 See ibid., 14. 
140 See ibid., 15; see also Zhu, “Telangpu zhengfu ‘Yin-Tai’ 
zhanlüe jiqi dui Zhongguo anquan de yingxiang” (see 
note 127). 
141 ASEAN+3: Meeting between ASEAN plus China, Japan 
and Korea; ASEAN 10+1: Meeting between the 10 ASEAN 
countries and China. 
142 See He, “Meiguo Yin-Tai zhanlüe shizhi yu Zhongguo 
de zhidu zhiheng” (see note 126); Wang Kai, “Jiangouzhuyi 
shijiao xia de Tulangpu zhengfu ‘Yin-Tai’ zhanlüe” [The 
“Indo-Pacific” strategy of the Trump government from a 
constructivist perspective], Zhengzhou Hangkong Gongye Guanli 
Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aero-
nautics (Social Science Edition)], no. 1 (2019): 1-8; Liu Feitao, 
“Meiguo ‘Yin-Tai’ jichu sheshi touzi jingzheng celüe” [The 
competitive tactics of the USA in “Indo-Pacific” infrastruc-
ture investments], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], 
no. 4 (2019): 1–20 (19 f.). 
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Chinese initiatives in response to the 
Indo-Pacific 
The quintessence of these analyses of the Indo-Pacific 
strategy is that China’s main concern is preventing 
this geopolitical concept from becoming a rallying 
point for neighbouring states and the entire region 
to form a common front against China. 
Chinese experts do in fact discern a softening of 
their own leadership’s assertive and aggressive for-
eign policy behaviour since Donald Trump took office 
in 2017,143 with efforts now focused primarily on 
weakening/splitting the Quad. In May 2018, Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang visited Tokyo, and in October 
2018 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s return visit to 
Beijing took place – for the first time in seven years. 
The tense relations between China and India follow-
ing the border incident in Doklam 2017 are also 
returning to a more constructive course following 
informal summits between President Xi Jinping and 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan in April 
2018 and Mamallapuram in October 2019.144 In con-
trast, no attempts at rapprochement have been made 
with Australia – the intense domestic political 
debate there on China’s influence may prevent the 
two sides from striking a more conciliatory tone. Or 
perhaps the Chinese side sees no need for action here 
because of Australia’s strong economic dependence 
on China. 
In the opinion of its experts, China is also making 
an effort to establish a more acceptable policy to-
wards the ASEAN countries by pushing ahead with 
the long-negotiated Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea. Chinese analysts cite the expansion of 
security cooperation in the form of maritime military 
exercises, which were held jointly for the first time 
in October 2018, as a further example.145 
Despite the escalating trade and technology dispute 
in 2019, the Chinese rhetoric vis-à-vis the United 
States has been restrained, at least officially. Even if 
media such as the Global Times, which is known for 
its nationalist and “hard line” position, may take a 
sharper tone, the Chinese leadership (as well as many 
 
143 See Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness” 
(see note 121), 20ff. 
144 In June 2020, however, new conflicts flared up at a 
disputed part of the Sino-Indian border, triggering the most 
serious crisis since 1975 with casualties on both sides. 
145 Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness” 
(see note 121), 25. 
experts) have made a recognizable effort to balance 
competition, strategic rivalry and cooperation in rela-
tions with the United States. 
It is doubtful, however, whether the countries sur-
rounding China share China’ self-assessment of its 
own positive behavioural changes and whether their 
fears have really been allayed. 
The Indo-Pacific as a containment strategy 
China has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific” 
but has adhered to the term “Asia-Pacific”. The vari-
ous arguments cited by the Indo-Pacific advocats – 
the shifting of global economic focus to the region, 
the merging of the two seas, the increased strategic 
importance of India and the Indian Ocean, the regional 
community of values and norms – are all rejected 
as unconvincing in Chinese academic publications. 
Nevertheless, China recognizes in the Indo-Pacific 
strategy a trend towards increasing strategic rivalry 
between the United States and China. The U.S. policy 
mix of cooperation and containment, which from the 
Chinese perspective has existed for decades, is clearly 
shifting in favour of the latter. 
For China, the main goal is to avert 
the potential danger of a full-scale 
confrontation with the United States. 
For China, therefore, the main goal is to avert the 
potential danger of full-scale economic and/or mili-
tary confrontation. The starting point for this is above 
all China’s policy towards its neighbouring states and 
the region, which must be carefully calibrated to pre-
vent the emergence of a united front with the United 
States against China. China assumes that peaceful 
coexistence is – or must be – possible between the 
United States as an established power and China as 
an emerging power, because the costs and collateral 
damage of a confrontation are not acceptable to either 
side (or the other states of the region). 
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The EU and its member states, with one exception, 
have not yet taken a position on the Indo-Pacific; only 
France has explicitly committed itself to it. In 2016 
France underscored its role as a resident power in the 
region in the official document France and Security in 
the Asia-Pacific,146 and in 2019 a follow-up document 
was published under the title France and Security in the 
Indo-Pacific.147 The UK has taken a less clear position; 
at least official documents have so far made almost 
no reference to the Indo-Pacific.148 Neither the EU 
itself nor any of its members have so far officially 
declared their support for the Trump administration’s 
FOIP strategy or the Indo-Pacific concepts of other 
actors, although European politicians occasionally 
use the term “Indo-Pacific” in speeches when they are 
in Asia.149 
 
146 Ministry of Defence of France, France and Security in 
the Asia-Pacific (Paris, 2016). 
147 Ministry of Defence of France, France and Security in 
the Indo-Pacific (see note 3). The Defence and National Security 
Strategic Review 2017 mentions the term “Indo-Pacific ”only 
once. 
148 Die National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and 
Security Review 2015 does not mention the “Indo-Pacific”. Only 
in the third annual report of July 2019 it is mentioned once, 
see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/819613/NSS_ 
and_SDSR_2015_Third_Annual_Report_-_FINAL__2_.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2020). An official document of the British 
Ministry of Defence from October 2018, Global Strategic Trends. 
The Future Starts Today, Sixth Edition, also does not contain 
the term, see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
771309/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_Starts_ 
Today.pdf (accessed 29 April 2020). 
149 See e.g., Mark Rutte, Rakesh Bharti Mittal and Indrani 
Bagchi, “The Netherlands: India’s Pivot to a Strong and 
Competitive Europe”, New Delhi, 24 May 2018, https:// 
carnegieindia.org/2018/05/24/netherlands-india-s-pivot-to-
strong-and-competitive-europe-event-6916 (accessed 29 April 
2020). See also the speech by the British Minister of Defence 
Representatives of European (and non-European) 
think tanks, on the other hand, are intensively debat-
ing whether the EU or European states should take 
up the term “Indo-Pacific” and actively engage with 
the concept. They are also discussing whether Europe 
could make a specific contribution and, if so, what 
form it should take.150 
(Asia) experts in- and outside of Europe have put 
forward various arguments as to why the EU (and 
the member states) should take a clear position on the 
Indo-Pacific and adopt the term. They do not see 
the lack of a common understanding among the pro-
ponents or participants of the concept as an obstacle; 
rather they assert that it is precisely because the con-
cept is still in the process of being developed that 
Europeans could help shape the strategic debates 
on the Indo-Pacific if they were to become involved 
now.151 They argue that, given its dependence on 
trade and its economic interests, the EU cannot afford 
 
Gavin Williamson at the IISS-Shangri-La Dialogue 2018 
(3 June 2018), who mentioned the cooperation with France 
in the Indo-Pacific region. 
150 See, e.g., Eva Pejsova, The Indo-Pacific. A Passage to Europe? 
EUISS Brief Issue 3/2018 (Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies [EUISS], 15 March 2018), https://www.iss. 
europa.eu/content/indo-pacific-%E2%80%93-passage-europe 
(accessed 29 April 2020); Matthew Lillehaugen, “The ‘Free 
and Open’ Indo-Pacific: A Call for European Partnership”, 
The Asia Dialogue, 22 June 2018, https://theasiadialogue.com/ 
2018/06/22/the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-a-call-for-
european-partnership/ (accessed 29 April 2020); David Brew-
ster and C. Raja Mohan, Germany in the Indo-Pacific. Securing 
Interests Through Partnerships, KAS International Reports online 
(Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung [KAS], March 2019) 10, 
https://www.kas.de/documents/259121/4890181/DE_kas_ai_ 
online_nr_10_2019_brewster_mohan_web.pdf/0984a025-
dcfd-c9a9-31ca-9210edf4ee12?version=1.0&t=1551859148828 
(accessed 7 June 2020). 
151 See, e.g., Lillehaugen, “The ‘Free and Open’ Indo-
Pacific” (see note 150). 
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not to take a position.152 According to a joint publica-
tion by an Indian and an Australian author, in the 
long term China’s unilateral approach in the Indo-
Pacific will pose a greater challenge to the interna-
tional order than Russia’s comportment in Eurasia.153 
The authors conclude that for Germany, in particular, 
there is no alternative but to increase its commit-
ment: 
“This is why countries with important interests in 
the Indo-Pacific and the international order have 
little choice but to respond to China’s challenge 
and the uncertainties surrounding Washington’s 
willingness to uphold the global order.”154 
Security experts from the region underline the 
fact that, unlike in Europe, multilateral approaches 
to security are a rarity in the Indo-Pacific, where bi-, 
tri- and minilateral formats tend to predominate.155 
Europe, they point out, also has limited military 
capabilities in the region. 
However, some authors argue that when engaging 
in the Indo-Pacific region, Europeans could focus on 
areas neglected by other actors. These include non-
traditional security issues, good governance, and 
climate policy. Europe could even assume the role of 
a neutral actor and help stabilize the growing great 
power rivalry in the region by promoting the rules-
based order and cooperative security initiatives.156 
The EU could also take a leading role on trade issues, 
building on the FTA with Japan. Last but not least, 
other European nations such as Germany or Norway 
could participate in the military operations in the 
South China Sea regularly conducted by France.157 
Maintaining a neutral stance is seen as a challenge, 
however. In order to avoid giving the impression 
of partisanship, it is argued that Europeans must 
honour their commitments to China while simul-
 
152 See Pejsova, The Indo-Pacific. A Passage to Europe? 
(see note 150), 4. 
153 See Brewster and Mohan, Germany in the Indo-Pacific 
(see note 150), 3. 
154 Ibid. 
155 See ibid. 
156 See Pejsova, The Indo-Pacific. A Passage to Europe? 
(see note 150), 4. See also Lillehaugen, “The ‘Free and Open’ 
Indo-Pacific” (see note 150). 
157 See Lillehaugen: “The ‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific” 
(see note 150). 
taneously supporting the principles of the Quad’s 
democratic coalition.158 
The Indo-Pacific concept of France 
In her foreword to the document France and Security 
in the Indo-Pacific, Defence Minister Florence Parly em-
phasises: “[…] France is a nation of the Indo-Pacific 
region and holds a distinctive place in this part of 
the world […]”. The Indo-Pacific is geographically 
described as a maritime and land area “shaped by 
interactions around strategic centres of gravity – 
India, China, Southeast Asia, Australia”. It includes 
the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans and forms a 
continuum stretching from the East African coast to 
the American west coast159 (see map on page 37). 
For France, defending its national 
interests in the region and 
maintaining a rules-based order 
are paramount. 
France’s interests in the region are linked to French 
possessions (islands in the South Pacific and Indian 
Oceans and some off the East African coast, such as 
Mayotte, Scattered Islands, Réunion), the Exclusive 
Economic Zones derived from them (EEZs; 9 mil-
lion sq km), the approximately 1.6 million French 
nationals in the region and the French military pres-
ence protecting the possessions.160 Geographically 
and strategically, France’s understanding of the Indo-
Pacific largely coincides with what previous French 
strategy papers have called “Asia-Pacific”.161 
For France, defending its national interests, pre-
serving its sovereignty and maintaining a rules-based 
order are paramount. The 2019 paper highlights 
France’s network of strategic partnerships in the Indo-
Pacific with countries such as India, Japan, Australia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Indonesia and
 
158 See Pejsova, The Indo-Pacific. A Passage to Europe? 
(see note 150), 4. 
159 Ministry of Defence of France, France and Security in 
the Indo-Pacific (see note 3), 2. 
160 Ebd., p  6: Military personnel: a total of 7,000 perma-
nent, of which 4,100 in the Indian Ocean, 2,900 in the 
Pacific. A map with military assets in the region can be 
found on p. 7. 
161 Already in France and Security in the Asia-Pacific 
(see note 146), the Minister of Defence’s foreword states: 
“France is a power in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific” (p. 1). 
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Vietnam; its active contributions to various regional 
security formats and dialogues; and military exer-
cises.162 The importance of French arms exports to the 
region, with India, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore 
as the most important buyers, is also emphasised, as 
is France’s keen interest in the nexus between the en-
vironment/climate change and security/defence.163 
Moreover, French defence ministers regularly em-
ploy the term “Indo-Pacific” in their speeches. As in 
the French strategy paper, the focus is primarily on 
France as an Indo-Pacific nation and its military and 
military-diplomatic engagement in the region. 
Initiatives by France and other 
European countries 
Since 2014, France has demonstrated its commitment 
to the region mainly through military exercises. These 
include joint manoeuvres with the naval forces of 
India, for example, but also regular excursions by 
warships into the South China Sea near the artificial 
islands created by China.164 In 2016, Jean-Yves Le 
Drian, then French Defence Minister, surprised his 
European counterparts with the idea of establishing 
a stable and visible European naval presence in the 
South China Sea.165 
In March 2019 France sent the aircraft carrier 
Charles de Gaulle to the region (“Opération Clemen-
ceau”). In addition to the United States, a small num-
ber of other EU member states – Italy, Austria, Por-
tugal and Denmark – participated in this French 
mission by contributing hardware or personnel.166 
 
162 Ministry of Defence of France, France and Security in the 
Indo-Pacific (see note 3), 6 and 8. France’s efforts to work with 
the ADMM-Plus are particularly mentioned (ibid., 4). 
163 Ibid., 12. 
164 See, e.g., “France Challenges Beijing in South China 
Sea”, The Straits Times, 12 June 2018, https://www.straits 
times.com/world/europe/france-challenges-beijing-in-south-
china-sea (accessed 29 April 2020). 
165 Embassy of France in Abu Dhabi, “Speech Mr. Jean-
Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence at the Shangri-La Dia-
logue”, Singapore, 5 June 2016, https://ae.ambafrance.org/ 
Speech-Mr-Jean-Yves-Le-Drian-Minister-of-Defence-at-the-
Shangri-La-Dialogue (accessed 29 April 2020). 
166 See, e.g., “French Aircraft Carrier Gets Underway for 
First Deployment since 2016”, Naval Today, 5 March 2019, 
https://navaltoday.com/2019/03/05/french-aircraft-carrier-gets-
underway-for-first-deployment-since-2016/ (accessed 29 April 
Even if such operations are largely symbolic in 
nature, for observers, including those in the region, 
they demonstrate a shared commitment to the rules-
based international order.167 France is also strength-
ening its security cooperation with India, Australia 
and Japan.168 
Post Brexit, France is the only EU 
country with a military presence in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
In an interview in 2017, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Taro Kono offered the Foreign Ministers of France and 
Great Britain a collaborative role in the partnership 
between the United States, Japan, Australia and 
India.169 It remains to be seen how Great Britain will 
position itself in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region 
after its withdrawal from the EU and what capacities 
it will actually provide there. In any case, France will 
then be the only EU country with a military presence 
in the region. Paris can be expected to put the Indo-
Pacific issue on the EU agenda – at the latest when 
it assumes the EU presidency in the first half of 2022 
if there is no European positioning by then. It has 
already made offers of cooperation under this label, 
probably assuming that Europeans will align them-
selves with France’s understanding of the concept. 
At the meeting of the Franco-German Council of 
Ministers in October 2019, the foreign ministers of 
the two countries agreed on a number of measures 
which they intend to push forward jointly. Measure 
6 reads as follows: 
“France and Germany are committed to jointly 
strengthen the EU-Asia connectivity strategy, inter 
alia with the aim of developing a European strategy 
for the Indo-Pacific region [emphasis by the authors]. 
 
2020). The Charles de Gaulle reached Singapore in late May 
2019, in time for the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. 
167 See, e.g., Lillehaugen, “The ‘Free and Open’ Indo-
Pacific” (see note 150). 
168 See Brewster and Mohan, Germany in the Indo-Pacific 
(see note 150), 4. See also CRS, Indo-Pacific Strategies of U.S. 
Allies and Partners (see note 5), 21f. 
169 Saki Hayashi and Yosuke Onchi, “Japan to Propose 
Dialogue with US, India and Australia”, Nikkei Asian Review, 
26 October 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-to-
propose-dialogue-with-US-India-and-Australia2 (accessed 
29 April 2020). 
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They are committed to promote the unity of the 
European Union on EU-Asia policy issues.”170 
The fact that the development of a European Indo-
Pacific strategy is here directly linked to the Asia-
Connectivity Strategy171 broadens the predominantly 
military and military-diplomatic orientation of 
France’s Indo-Pacific concept and adds an economic 
and political dimension. Further bilateral talks on 
this are already taking place. 
While France, with its clear strategic positioning, is 
the exception in the EU, some other member states – 
Germany, Italy and those states involved in French 
military exercises in the Indo-Pacific – and the EU 
institutions are at least considering how to engage 
with the Indo-Pacific concept. In most other member 
states, this issue is unlikely to be on the political 
agenda at all; at least there is no evidence of it in offi-
cial documents, white papers or speeches by politi-
cians. There is therefore almost less evidence of an 
intra-European consensus on this issue than there 
is on China’s BRI. After all, the latter has been in-
tensively debated within the European Union (and 
among the EU ambassadors in Beijing) since Europe 
and the member states themselves are important 
target regions for the BRI. Against this background, 
the question of how the EU and its members should 
position themselves with regard to the Indo-Pacific 
region is all the more pressing. 
 
170 Federal Foreign Office, “Erklärung der Außenminister 
anlässlich des Deutsch-Französischen Ministerrats vom 
16. Oktober 2019”, Berlin, 16 October 2019, https://www. 
auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2257806/8f3c85e49853716 
cecc822f421dd 6deb/roadmap-data.pdf (accessed 29 April 
2020). 
171 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. 
Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an EU Strategy, 
JOIN (2018) 31 final (Brussels, 19 September 2018), https:// 
eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_ 
connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_ 
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The systematic comparison of the Indo-Pacific con-
cepts has shown, firstly, that various interpretations 
of the term exist. Divergences among the concepts of 
the United States, Japan, Australia, India and ASEAN 
were identified with regard to a number of character-
istics/core elements: a) the expansion of the Indo-
Pacific as a geographical area, b) the objectives asso-
ciated with each respective concept, c) the focus or 
weighting of individual policy fields within each 
respective concept, d) the question of China’s inclu-
sion or exclusion, and e) the significance of bi-, mini- 
and multilateral approaches to trade and security 
policy. 
Although all actors refer to the Indo-Pacific, there 
is still no common understanding of exactly what is 
meant by it. As a result, the various concepts of the 
Indo-Pacific contain all sorts of potential entry points 
and avenues of interaction for the EU and its member 
states. The ASEAN Outlook, for example, with its 
emphasis on multilateral security cooperation, pro-
vides a link for corresponding European ideas. Other 
examples are the interest in multilateral free trade 
agreements expressed above all by Japan and Aus-
tralia or the widely proclaimed goal of maintaining a 
rules-based international order. France’s Indo-Pacific 
strategy also provides points of reference for other 
European states, for example by linking environment, 
climate change and security policy in the region and 
by explicitly referring to and supporting multilateral 
regional formats such as the ADMM-Plus. 
Secondly, the study makes it clear that the majority 
of actors understand and use “Indo-Pacific” not as a 
geographical term but rather as a decidedly political 
or strategic concept. Some of these concepts are based 
on widely divergent norms, interests and ideas of 
order. Thirdly, the second finding explains why China 
sees the emergence and use of the term as part of 
an anti-Chinese containment strategy by Washington 
and therefore rejects it outright. Fourthly, despite all 
the divergences, there are also convergences common 
to all actors, namely the reference to a rules-based 
international order, to the improvement of connec-
tivity, and the positive references to ASEAN and its 
multilateral forums. Fifthly, the many divergences 
between the various Indo-Pacific concepts neverthe-
less make its adoption difficult for third parties; if 
they were to consider adopting the concept, they 
would first have to clarify which of the various inter-
pretations and associated political connotations they 
prefer and why. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that a 
discussion has flared up in Europe as to whether and 
how one should position oneself in this regard and 
what action to take. France is so far the only EU mem-
ber state to use the term “Indo-Pacific” and has pre-
sented a corresponding strategic concept. However, 
neither the EU nor the other member states have so 
far followed the rationale of the French concept – 
namely protecting their own territories, citizens and 
EEZs in the Indo-Pacific. 
At the EU level, in Germany and in the other mem-
ber states, the first thing that must be clarified is 
whether and, if so, how the term “Indo-Pacific” can be 
used: if not in a neutral manner, then at least in a less 
securitised and less geo-politicised sense, for example 
as an (economic) geographical designation. This would 
describe the realities of trade, energy and investment 
flows more adequately than the previously used term 
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“Asia-Pacific”. For Europe, “Indo-Pacific” also does 
better justice to the shift in economic focus and the 
growing importance of the Indian Ocean (and India) 
than the previously predominant “Asia-Pacific” con-
struct. Furthermore, Europe has an economic and 
political interest in maintaining a rules-based order 
in the region. These two aspects, among others, can 
serve as points of departure and help to frame the 
European debate on the Indo-Pacific. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be clarified what con-
crete goals and priorities Europe intends to pursue, 
including the importance of bi-, mini- and multilat-
eral approaches. Last but not least, there needs to be 
an open discussion about whether China should be 
included or excluded from a possible future European 
Indo-Pacific approach. 
In their deliberations, the EU and its members 
should eschew the zero-sum logic that currently 
dominates the relationship between the United States 
and China. Instead, they should formulate an inde-
pendent position. Ideally, they have three options at 
their disposal: 
1. “Equidistance”: Europe could make a conscious 
and transparent decision to retain the term “Asia-
Pacific” and refrain from referring to the “Indo-
Pacific”. This would bring the EU into line with 
states such as South Korea or Canada, which have 
also refrained from adopting the term, and would 
also make it possible to avoid what would amount 
to taking sides “for” or “against” the United States 
or China – at least conceptually speaking. Sub-
sequently, the EU could try to create synergies with 
both FOIP and BRI on the basis of its own standards 
and interests while at the same time maintaining 
a kind of “equidistance”. The disadvantage of this 
option lies in the permanent hedging / manoeuvr-
ing between Washington and Beijing and the asso-
ciated loss of Europe’s own political and economic 
ability to shape events and of strategic autonomy. 
As a result, there would be little in terms of a con-
tribution of the European Union to the Indo-
Pacific. 
2. “Alignment”: This would entail adopting and inter-
nalizing one of the already existing interpretations 
of the “Indo-Pacific”. From a German or European 
point of view, following the French concept would 
be an obvious option and would have several ad-
vantages: (1) It would demonstrate that the “Franco-
German” engine works; (2) it would lower trans-
action costs by “Europeanising” a national security 
strategy and eliminating the need for a new con-
ception; and (3) at least rudimentary military 
capacities on the ground would be provided for, 
initially by France. Europeanising the French 
approach would also give it greater visibility and 
weight in the region itself. 
 One of the disadvantages of this option is that 
adopting the French concept, with its emphasis on 
French national interests overseas, would be poten-
tially difficult to communicate to a European pub-
lic. Another disadvantage could be that the (hither-
to) French orientation is strongly focused on security 
matters whilst failing to sufficiently address many 
other important policy areas. A French “copyright” 
would make it difficult for other member states to 
put forth correspondent proposals for amendments 
or additions and could lead to conflicts over inter-
pretation and competence. Similarly, this approach 
would shift the burden-sharing to France’s disad-
vantage, which could lead to intra-European con-
flicts. And finally, China could interpret the use of 
the term “Indo-Pacific” as participation in a U.S.-
led containment strategy. 
3. “Autonomy”: Europe could also define its own 
understanding of the “Indo-Pacific” on the basis 
of its own norms and values, drawing on ideas 
and approaches that have already been developed 
at the European level. The EU strategy paper on 
connectivity in Asia, for example, provides a 
framework for greater commitment to infrastruc-
ture development in the region. An Indo-Pacific 
concept at the EU level would have the advantage 
of making an independent contribution. Since the 
debate on the “Indo-Pacific” is not static, an inde-
pendent concept could be used to try to actively 
shape regulatory policy in accordance with one’s 
own standards and interests. In doing so, the EU 
could certainly refer to elements emphasised by 
other actors in their conception of the Indo-Pacific 
(such as inclusivity based on common rules and 
freedom of navigation for all states). The partner-
ship with Japan, which was concluded at the Con-
nectivity Forum in Brussels in September 2019, 
could serve as a basis for infrastructure coopera-
tion. A further advantage would be that the con-
cept would ideally be supported by all member 
states, thus enabling the EU to demonstrate coher-
ence to the outside world. 
 One disadvantage could be the high transaction 
costs that would arise from the intra-European 
negotiation process. Moreover, the EU would have 
to provide the resources necessary to achieve the 
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stated goals; otherwise the Indo-Pacific concept 
would have little effect. Moreover, even with this 
option China could interpret the adoption of the 
term as participation in the U.S.-led containment 
strategy, which could lead to conflicts with Beijing. 
To develop a solely German Indo-Pacific concept 
would seem absurd given Germany’s limited diplo-
matic and non-existent military capabilities in the 
region. Moreover, such a move could be seen as com-
peting with the French approach and thus strengthen 
the perception of Europe in the region as a politically 
divided actor. And formulating a German concept 
could at least indirectly undermine any kind of com-
mon European approach. 
While choosing one of these options is important, 
it is perhaps even more important to define Europe’s 
economic, security and normative interests in the 
region. In addition, the necessary resources must be 
made available to advance these interests. Only if the 
latter is guaranteed will Europe be able to act credibly 
in the region and in its relations with China. 
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Abbreviations 
 
ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
AOIP ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ARI Analyses of the Elcano Royal Institute 
ARIA Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
BUILD Act Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development Act 
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
EAMF Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum 
EAS East Asia Summit 
EDGE Enhancing Development and Growth through 
Energy 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU European Union 
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operation 
GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United 
States 
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
IDFC U.S. International Development Finance 
Corporation 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association 
IPBF Indo-Pacific Business Forum 
IPEC Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor 
IPTI Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative 
ISPI Italian Institute for International Political 
Studies 
ITAN Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network 
KAS Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
LMI Lower Mekong Initiative 
MPAC Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 
NAM non-aligned movement 
NSS National Security Strategy 
OBOR One Belt, One Road 
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
PALM Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting 
PEP Papua New Guinea Electrification Partnership 
PRIF Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility 
Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
TAF Transaction Advisory Fund 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea 
USAID United States Agency for International Devel-
opment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
